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HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
"[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding."'
In the last fifteen years alone, there has been enough commentary on
constitutional interpretation to fill more volumes than even the most
dedicated scholar of constitutional law could ever hope to read and com-
prehend fully. The theories range from noninterpretivism to strict
originalism.2 Under noninterpretivism, courts are allowed to base consti-
tutional adjudication upon extra-constitutional principles. Under strict
originalism, courts are bound to a static Constitution of 1787, and its
amendments as of their effective dates.
Adjudication of constitutional issues demands a significant amount
of judicial resources and accounts for a substantial number of pages in
the federal and state reporters. As a result, courts are criticized for a pre-
occupation with the part of their function that requires them to decide
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original).
The Court also noted that "[a constitution's] nature, therefore, requires, that only its great
outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which
compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves." Id.
2. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLIT-
ICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); C. DUCAT, MODES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
(1978); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); M.
PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
POLICY MAKING BY THE JUDICIARY (1982); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,
27 STAN. L. Rv. 703, 706 n.9 (1975); Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L.
REv. 1033 (1981); see Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradic-
tion of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1981) (Noninterpre-
tivists argue that "the rights at stake... are not specified by the text or the original history of
the Constitution. They argue that the judiciary is nonetheless authorized, if not duty bound, to
protect individuals against governmental interference with these rights, which can be discov-
ered in conventional morality or derived through the methods of philosophy and adjudica-
tion." (emphasis added)). Compare Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv.
353, 380 (1981) (originalism may not "be used to reach results contrary to the Framers' specific
and known intent ... ." (emphasis in original)), with Michelman, Constancy to an Ideal Object,
56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 406, 412 (1981) ("[T]he judicial role... necessitates, rather than excludes,
rationalistic resort to 'general principles of political morality not derived from the constitu-
tional text or the structure it creates.'" (quoting Monaghan, supra, at 353)); Perry, Noninter-
pretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278, 324
(1981) [hereinafter Perry, Noninterpretive Review] ("[O]nce the judge resolves to move beyond
specific value judgments constitutionalized by the Framers, the ultimate source of decisional
norms is the judge's own values .. "); and ia at 341 ("[IThe Constitution does not give the
Court the power of noninterpretive review, yet I have not hesitated to say that the Court can
legitimately exercise that power.").
There are many forms of noninterpretivism, interpretivism, originalism, and nonoriginal-
ism. Therefore, unless the context indicates otherwise, when these and other such terms are
used in this Article, they are meant to refer to a species of theories rather than a single theory.
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constitutional issues.3 The criticism is that the courts seem to have for-
gotten that their primary function is to "resolve ordinary disputes" and
not to give "meaning to constitutional values."4
A significant amount of the commentators' and courts' prolific writ-
ings may be attributable to: (1) the recent bicentennial of the Declara-
tion of Independence (1976); (2) the bicentennials of the drafting (1987)
and ratification (1988) of the Constitution; (3) the bicentennial of the first
year of operation under the new Constitution (1989); (4) the current bi-
centennial of the Supreme Court (1990); and (5) the impending bicenten-
nial of the Bill of Rights (1991). Some commentators, however, have a
different explanation. They feel that the volume of constitutional theo-
rizing is a sign that our judicial system is not well.5
No generally accepted theory of constitutional interpretation has
emerged despite (or due to) the abundance of writings on the subject.6
Consequently, courts and commentators lack an effective criterion by
which to judge the decisions of judges. The lack of an effective criterion
leads to an expectation that the meaning and nature of the Constitution
will change with the varying composition of the judiciary.7 This brand of
legal realism is an evil that exists because we have forgotten "it is a con-
stitution we are expounding."'
In the first section of this Article, I demonstrate why noninterpretiv-
ism, generally, and nonoriginalist interpretation, more specifically, are
not.suited for the task of constitutional interpretation 9 in the context of
3. See, e.g., G. McDOWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITU-
TIONAL THEORY 33 (Center for Judicial Studies, 1985).
4. Id. at 33. Some of this criticism may be well-founded. However, in the context of
constitutional adjudication, it is often impossible to "resolve ordinary disputes" without resort-
ing to, determining, and giving "meaning to [relevant] constitutional values."
5. See, e.g., Bork, Forward to G. McDOWELL, supra note 3, at v.
6. This problem is not new. As Leslie Dunbar has noted, "[n]one of the Supreme
Court's critics would accuse it of having disposed of its work by application of a consistent
dogma. On the contrary, the Court has chiefly impressed by its groping for principles, both
substantive and jurisdictional." Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L.
REV. 627 (1956).
7. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1 (1971).
8. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original).
9. Disagreement over the meaning of the terms compounds the problem of disagreement
over substance and procedural results. The terms nonoriginalism and noninterpretivism are
sometimes interchanged. Likewise, originalism and interpretivism are sometimes equated. See
Sandalow, supra note 2, at 1033-34. These terms, however, are not equivalent. Noninterpre-
tivists reject the binding force of constitutional principals while nonoriginalists merely reject
the binding force of the original meaning. Interpretivists accept the binding force of the Con-
stitution, but not (as originalists would) necessarily its original meaning. See Clinton, Original
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constitutional adjudication of individual rights.10 In the second section, I
posit that, in the context of constitutional adjudication of individual
rights, moderate intentionalism'1 is a better alternative to nonoriginalis-
tic interpretation and other forms of originalism.12 Finally, I seek to
Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of "This Constitution, " 72 IowA L. REV.
1176, 1182 n.4 (1987).
Some writers assert that "[w]hat distinguishes the exponent of the pure interpretive model
is his insistence that the only norms used in constitutional adjudication must be those inferable
from the text ...." Grey, supra note 2, at 706 n.9 (1975); see also J. ELY, supra note 2, at 1
(Interpretivists take the position that "judges deciding constitutional issues should confine
themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution
[while noninterpretivism is] the contrary view that courts should go beyond that set of refer-
ences and enforce norms that cannot be discovered within the four corners of the document.").
What Professor Grey and Dean Ely call interpretivism is referred to in this Article as textual-
ism (as opposed to as intentionalism). In this Article, textualists and intentionalists are further
divided into originalists and nonoriginalists. These classifications are preferable because under
either of these approaches, courts are charged with the task of interpreting the Constitution-
even if from a nonoriginalistic standpoint. Thus, these approaches are not noninterpretive.
For this reason the terms noninterpretivism and noninterpretivists are reserved for those theo-
rists who base constitutional adjudication upon factors wholly extrinsic to either the text or the
intention of the Constitution. See, eg., Perry, Noninterpretive Review, supra note 2, at 324 (the
"ultimate source of decisional norms is the judge's own values (albeit, values ideally arrived at
through, and tested in the crucible of, a very deliberate search for right answers)"). To soften
the impact of the claim that it is appropriate to resort to extra-constitutional values, some
noninterpretivists admit that "[n]o contemporary constitutional theorists... seriously disputes
the legitimacy of interpretative review." Id. at 280. However, they contend that this interpre-
tive model is only one of the sources of legitimate values in constitutional adjudication.
10. This adjudication involves what some others have called "human rights issues."
Perry, Noninterpretive Review, supra note 2, at 280.
11. See infra notes 139-66 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of mod-
erate originalism and the brand of moderate intentionalism advocated here. However, it
should be noted at this point that at the heart of the theory advocated here is the notion that
constitutional principles are not created by constitutional rules (specific application). Instead,
constitutional rules are derived from and are designed to advance underlying principles. As a
result, under this model, in order to give sufficient deference to the Constitution, it is not
necessary for constitutional cases to be resolved in the exact manner that they would have been
at some point in the past. It is more important to reach results that advance the original
underlying principles--even if those results were not originally conceived or even if they were
originally rejected.
12. For a more complete discussion of the distinctions between the various forms of
originalism, see Brest, The Misconceived Quest For Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv.
204 (1980).
All forms of originalism give some degree of binding force to the Constitution as origi-
nally drafted and would therefore lead to better and more consistent results than nonoriginalis-
tic approaches. In addition, both moderate intentionalism and moderate textualism would
allow courts to "remember" both constitutional features referred to in McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), that only its great outlines and its important objects
should be designated. However, textualism is inconsistent with original interpretive intent, see
Berger, "Original Intention" in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296, 314
(1986), and is therefore not true originalism. See infra discussion at note 136 and accompany-
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prove that the resort to principles of natural law13 in constitutional adju-
dication is not only permissible, but required under originalistic theories
of constitutional interpretation. 4
ing text. But see Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885, 903-04 (1981) (concluding that textualism is consistent with original interpretive intent).
The conclusions drawn in this Article relate to the original Constitution and the Bill of
Rights, which immediately followed. The interpretive intent relative to later Amendments has
not been reviewed and may have been different. When the issue involves interpretation of later
Amendments, the appropriate inquiry would be to focus on the original interpretive intent at
the time of their drafting and adoption. Of course, later Amendments should be considered in
interpreting the original Constitution and Bill of Rights. Constitutional Amendments change
both the nature and structure of the Constitution and the society in which it operates. Consid-
ering these effects, and other changes in the operative factors that affect the Constitution's
underlying principles, the specific application must change accordingly. See infra notes 141-66
and accompanying text.
13. Formerly, a clear distinction was drawn between natural law and natural rights. See
Berns, The Constitution as Bill ofRights, in How DOES THE CONSTITUTION SECURE RIGHTS?
50, 55 (R. Goldwin and W. Schambra eds. 1985). Natural law usually referred to rights and
obligations that resulted from the natural order of things in the universe. Natural rights, how-
ever, usually connoted one's ultimate license to act except as limited by compacts and other
agreements. Such agreements and limitations were thought ultimately to be in the best inter-
ests of each individual in society. This distinction, however, has been blurred and lost over
time. In any event, the distinction is not significant for my thesis that original intent adjudica-
tion requires resort to conceptions not held by the original drafters, ratifiers, or populace of
1787. Therefore, unless the context indicates otherwise, no distinction is drawn between the
concepts of natural law and natural rights. A detailed discussion of the political theories and
other factors that give definitiveness to the resulting modern-day interpretation is left for other
works. See generally infra note 191.
Despite popular belief, natural law was not always based on divine revelation or inspira-
tion. Many of the natural law theorists who influenced early American political thought did
not base their theories on divine law. As early as the fifteenth century, John Fortescue set out
to distinguish natural law from divine law. See A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN
CONSTrUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS 36 n.3 (1948) (citing J. FORTESCUE, DE
NATURA LEGIS NATURAE). In addition, Grotius declared in 1625 that "he could conceive of
natural law even if there were no God." R. POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY 74 (1957).
But even if these theories had been based on divine revelation or inspiration, one need not
adopt Judeo-Christian principles or any other values considered to have been derived from
divine revelation or inspiration in order to concede the relevance of natural law theories to
constitutional adjudication. The theoretical foundations of natural law, or even a rejection of
its validity, should be irrelevant to originalists. One need only accept that original intent has
some degree of binding force and that this intent was influenced by natural law theories. The
"source" of natural law is, therefore, irrelevant except to the extent that it bears upon the
meaning and impact of the influence.
14. The moderate intentionalist theory of originalism advocated in this Article requires
resort to natural law theories. Accordingly, courts would still reach some of the substantive
results advocated by the self-styled noninterpretivists. Because the arguments are grounded in
the original Constitution, however, the results and process of adjudication would carry legiti-
macy not found in the noninterpretivistic and even nonoriginalistic approaches.
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I. Noninterpretivism, Nonoriginalism, and Constitutional
Interpretation
"An independent judiciary, like a unitary executive.., is an integral
feature of sound republican government." 15 Courts have the right to ex-
ercise the power of judicial review.16 As Alexander Hamilton asserted in
the The Federalist No. 78, it is proper and necessary for the judicial
branch to "liquidate and fix [the] meaning and operation" of the laws,
including the Constitution.17
Despite the courts' conceded authority to exercise the power of judi-
cial review, they must do so within constitutional constraints. That is
where noninterpretivism, in its strictest sense, goes awry. Noninterpreti-
vism and constitutional interpretation are contradictions in terms. The
underlying premise of noninterpretivism is that, even in the context of
constitutional adjudication, courts may resort to principles not incorpo-
rated into the Constitution. 8 This premise is an effective denial of the
Constitution as a binding source of law. As such, noninterpretivism re-
lies upon a premise of rather recent vintage that "effectively ignores and
bypasses the Constitution."1 9
Few constitutional theorists would deny that our governmental sys-
tem is one based upon republican theory20 and that the branches elected
15. G. MCDOWELL, supra note 3, at 17.
16. This Article will not detail the debate over the legitimacy and authority for judicial
review. Vesting this authority in the judicial branch is warranted because the functions of the
three branches of government are constitutionally defined, see U.S. CONST. arts. I-III, and the
Constitution implicitly places this authority in the hands of the judiciary. Article III, § 2
states that "[tjhe judicial Power shall extend to all Cases... arising under this Constitution,
[and] the Laws of the United States .. " Implicit in this grant of power is the authority and
the mandate to the judicial branch to apply the Constitution and these laws in the exercise of
its judicial power. Part of the function of applying laws when there is a hierarchy of laws, as
the one established by the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, is to determine when
inferior laws conflict with a superior one. For more comprehensive support of the judicial
review, see R. POUND, supra note 13, at 77-81; A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
(1962); Attanasio, Everyman's Constitutional Law: 4 Theory of The Power of Judicial Review,
72 GEO. L.J. 1665 (1984); Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486
(1982); Perry, Noninterpretive Review, supra note 2.
17. THE FEDERALIST: A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 102 (E. Bourne ed. 1947) [hereinafter THE FEDERALIST].
18. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 412; Perry, Noninterpretive Review, note 2, at 324.
19. Bork, Forward to G. MCDOWELL, supra note 3, at v.
20. A distinction is drawn between a republican form of government and a representative
democracy. In the latter, the representatives seek to enforce the will of the electorate. In the
former, the elected representatives make decisions based on their own beliefs as to what would
be the best alternatives. In this system, the representatives do not act as mere agents of the
represented. Often the desire for re-election will, to a significant degree, cause those elected to
be more responsive to their constituency's desires than to their personal interests. However,
this is a result of human nature rather than a feature of republican government.
[Wol. 18:67
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through the regular political process21 should control a significant
number of the decisions made within our governmental system.2 2 Under
the Constitution, however, there are certain decisions that may not be
made by the government acting in the regular political process "no mat-
ter how democratically it decides to do them."23 In constitutional adju-
dication relating to individual rights, the question to be resolved is:
What decisions may result from the regular political process, and what
decisions may not? Our system entrusts the judiciary with the authority
to make this determination.2' However, when the courts impinge upon
the majority's right to govern without resort to constitutional limitation,
they act illegitimately.
25
21. The use of the term "regular political process" rather than merely the "political pro-
cess" is intentional. The distinction that is drawn is between the processes of the executive and
legislative branches, which are more directly answerable to the people, and the judiciary.
Although the judicial branch is ultimately answerable to the people in the political process, it
is in a much less direct manner.
22. The exercise of judicial review (even as limited in this Article) contradicts the notion
of government by directly accountable elected representatives: "[When the Supreme Court
declares unconstitutional a legislative act.., it thwarts the will of the representatives of the
actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority,
but against it. That, without mystic overtones, is what actually happens." A. BICKEL, supra
note 16, at 16-17.
23. Bork, supra note 7, at 2-3. As Judge Bork further notes:
A Madisonian system is not completely democratic, if by "democratic" we mean
completely majoritarian. It assumes that in wide areas of life majorities are entitled
to rule for no [reason other than because they are in the majority].... The model
also has a countermaioritarian premise, however, for it assumes that there are some
areas of life a majority should not control. There are some things a majority should
not do to us no matter how democratically it decides to do them. These are areas
properly left to individual freedom, and coercion by the majority in these aspects of
life is tyranny.
Id.
24. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
25. Bork, supra note 7, at 3 ("[The judiciary's] power is legitimate only if it has, and can
demonstrate in reasoned opinions that it has, a valid theory, derived from the Constitution
.." for limiting majority rule). Some self-styled noninterpretivists so categorize themselves
partly because they take an overly narrow view of the constitutional inquiry. They believe any
interpretation that strays from the original specific application of the text is noninterpretivistic.
However, so long as a court protects rights on a basis purportedly sanctioned by the Constitu-
tion (whether viewed from an originalist standpoint or not), the method is not noninterpretive
but interpretive. See supra note 9. In addition, even if courts were bound to an originalistic
approach as advocated here, they are not precluded from "enforc[ing] values beyond merely
those constitutionalized by the Framers." Perry, Noninterpretive Review, supra note 2, at 282.
As discussed in more detail below, courts are free to find constitutional limitation even if that
application goes beyond the original specific application of the document. The relevant inquiry
is whether the modern application is within the original underlying principles of the Constitu-
tion.
Another factor that may contribute to the rejection of moderate originalists by those who
style themselves as noninterpretivists is the restraining effect of a constitutionally-based model
of interpretation. Although the reins under a modern originalist approach loosen, those reins
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No theory of constitutional interpretation should allow judges to
substitute their vision of a better society for that of elected representa-
tives. It is well settled that "[1]aws may be unjust, may be unwise, may
be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not so be unconstitutional
...."26 Those who seek to have decisions made on extra-constitutional
bases must rely upon the regular political process to do so.27 "[I]f the
popular branches of government... are operating within the authority
granted to them by the Constitution, their judgment and not that of the
Court must obviously prevail.""8
For these reasons, this section will focus upon nonoriginalism, not
on noninterpretivism in the stricter sense discussed above.29 In a most
striking anomaly in their arguments, nonoriginalists must admit that the
original Constitution "remains the governing document of the United
States. It establishes the national government, its branches and offices,
its relationship to the states and the states' relationship among them-
selves. And although the amending power has been used sparingly, it is a
vital element in the constitutional scheme."30 Yet nonoriginalists deny
the binding force of that very document.
still impede the type of free-handed adjudication that some theorists advocate. See supra notes
2 and 9.
26. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 73 (M. Farrand ed.
1966) (quoting James Wilson).
27. Otherwise, judges would lose their status as the keepers of the constitutional covenant
and assume the position of "fortunately situated people with a roving commission to second-
guess Congress, state legislatures, and state and federal administrative officers concerning what
is best for the country." Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tnx. L. REV. 693,
698 (1976).
28. Id. at 696.
29. As Professor Henry Monaghan aptly points out:
It is... logically possible to maintain some ground other than the written constitu-
tion as the first principle in constitutional theorizing; but I simply find this argument
to be a barren one. The authoritative status of the written constitution is a legitimate
matter of debate for political theorists interested in the nature of political obligation.
That status is, however, an incontestable first principle for theorizing about Ameri-
can constitutional law. That I cannot otherwise 'prove' the constitutional text to be
the first principle is a necessary outcome of my first principle itself...
For the purposes of legal reasoning, the binding quality of the constitutional text
is itself incapable of and not in need of further demonstration. It is our master rule of
recognition....
Monaghan, supra note 2, at 383-84 (citations omitted). Professor Monaghan's comments do
not establish the basis for preferring originalist over non-originalist adjudication. They do,
however, demonstrate the impropriety of noninterpretivism as defined supra note 9. The pur-
pose of this and the following section is to demonstrate why originalist adjudication is
preferable.
30. Brest, supra note 12, at 236. It is also significant that the authority for judicial review
is derived from this very document.
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Nonoriginalism takes many forms.31 Among the nonoriginalists are
those who believe the original meaning of the text and the authors' origi-
nal intentions are totally irrelevant.32 However, there are also no-
noriginalists who give "the text and original history presumptive weight"
but would "not treat them as authoritative or binding.
' 33
Nonoriginalists admit that the notion characterizing judges as
bound by the consent given at the time of constitutional ratification is
rooted deeply in American political history and thought.34 Despite this
notion's deep-rooted nature, nonoriginalists argue that, even if consent to
be bound by the Constitution ever existed, such consent cannot bind our
society some two hundred years later.35 They argue further that the con-
tinued validity of the original Constitution must rest on the basis of a
present consent to be bound by the original document.36
31. However, nonoriginalism, in whatever form, is unacceptable. The following are at
least three ways that modem society could have rejected the original intent of the Constitution:
by amendment; by adopting a new constitution; or by revolution. Modem society has taken
none of these steps, nor can it be considered to have legitimated nonoriginalist interpretation.
See infra note 36. Therefore, for the reasons discussed throughout this Article, the Constitu-
tion's original meaning should, at least to some extent, be controlling.
32. See C. DUCAT, supra note 2, at 42-115. Even theories that would tie constitutional
interpretation to the text of the document might still be nonoriginalistic in nature. If the text is
to be interpreted without resort fo its original meaning, this brand of textualism is just as
nonoriginalistic as approaches that would ignore the original intent. "The principle point of
the originalist critique is to ascertain the meaning at the time the document was drafted, rather
than approaching the text in the later twentieth century from an ahistorical interpretive per-
spective." Clinton, supra note 9, at 1193 (emphasis in original).
33. Brest, supra note 12, at 205. The contention that nonoriginalist adjudication respects
the constitutional order by according presumptive weight to the text and original history, id,
is not convincing. According presumptive weight to the principles upon which the govern-
ment is founded rather than being bound by those principles does not serve the ends of consti-
tutional adjudication.
34. See Brest, supra note 12, at 225.
35. Id. at 225; see also Michelman, supra note 2; Simon, The Authority of the Framers of
the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be Justfied?, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1482, 1492
(1985).
36. However, nonoriginalists conclude that such consent may not be possible in a modern
industrial society. Brest, supra note 12. And if possible, the consent is not to the Framers'
Constitution, but to the hybrid that has derived through modem interpretation. Simon, supra
note 35, at 1510. Modem constitutional adjudication, however, is not as overtly hybrid as
these theorists contend. "'Ihe Court has always, when plausible (and, indeed, even when
not plausible), tended to talk an [originalistic] line.'" Perry, Noninterpretive Review, supra
note 2, at 280 n.6 (quoting J. ELY, supra note 2, at 3). The Court does so because of "the
suspect legitimacy of a [nonoriginalistic] line." Perry, Noninterpretive Review, supra note 2, at
280 n.6 Therefore, "[t]he claim that over time the polity has consented to and thereby legiti-
mated [nonoriginalistic] review is both doubtful and irrelevant. The polity as a whole could
not have consented to a mode of judicial review with which many of its members were not even
familiar." Id. at 328 (footnote omitted). In these quotations, orginalistic and nonoriginalistic
is substituted in brackets for interpretive and noninterpretive. Due to the interchange and
differing meaning given to the terms "interpretive" and "noninterpretive," see supra note 9,
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Because nonoriginalists no longer feel constrained by the original
Constitution, they are free to recommend "a designedly vague criterion:
How well, compared to possible alternatives, does the [interpretive] prac-
tice contribute to the well-being of our society-or, more narrowly, to
the ends of constitutional government?"37 Such nonoriginalist adjudica-
tion has been compared to that employed at common law to derive "legal
principles from custom, social practices, conventional morality, and pre-
cedent."38 Under such theories, however, judges are left with only their
own predilections to fill in the details and substantive content of rules to
better the "well-being of our society.",
39
Not all nonoriginalists would free judges from all restriction in the
search for substantive content. Some theorists attempt to provide con-
straints upon judges' discretion in choosing among competing principles.
One such attempt is known as neutral principles.' This theory has been
described as second only to originalism in popularity among the compet-
ing theories of constitutional adjudication." The theory, however, pro-
vides no guidance on how judges are to find and determine the
underlying principles that should guide their decisions.42 Nor does it
this substitution adds clarity. One might argue that the nonoriginalistic results have been legit-
imated by the acceptance of the people (an argument of which I am not yet convinced but am
willing to consider). This would eliminate the need for overruling well-established precedent.
This argument, however, ignores the intentional difficulty built into the amendment process
and would allow inertia and a minority of the states (one-third) to legitimate extra-constitu-
tional results. Even if prior nonoriginalists' results have been legitimated, the argument cannot
be used to legitimate the process of nonoriginalist adjudication because the process was not
revealed to the people.
37. Brest, supra note 12, at 226; see also Simon, supra note 35, at 1487 ("the basic crite-
rion for evaluating the arguments supporting the various methodologies or interpretations is
the extent to which those methodologies and interpretations promote a good and just society").
38. Brest, supra note 12, at 228-29; see also Michelman, supra note 2, at 412.
39. Brest, supra note 12, at 226. As advocates of nonoriginalistic adjudication admit, "it
is unlikely that a sizable segment of the American population would object to judges being
guided mainly by what is good and just in interpreting the Constitution, although people cer-
tainly would disagree about which particular interpretations correspond to these values." Si-
mon, supra note 35, at 1488. That is why some source of normative principles must be
provided to judges. Otherwise judges would be left to their own predilections of what is good
and just.
40. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1959). Neutral principles are not necessarily nonoriginalistic. Resort to other theories of
interpretation, which may be originalistic in nature, is necessary to determine the initial princi-
ple which is to be neutrally applied. Id at 19.
41. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 782 (1983). For a more complete criticism and discussion
of neutral principles, see id. at 808-21. Compare Bork, supra note 7, with Wechsler, supra note
40.
42. "[The requirement of generality of principle and neutrality of application does not
provide a source of substantive content." J. ELY, supra note 2, at 55.
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provide insight as to what specific judgments should be made in order to
resolve disputes while still advancing these principles.
Under the neutral principles theory, courts are obliged to render
principled decisions. A principled decision, however, is very narrowly
defined as "one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in a
case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any
immediate result that is involved."'43 Proponents of this theory use "the
term 'neutral principles' to capsulate [their] argument, though [they] rec-
ognize that the legal principle to be applied is itself never neutral because
it embodies a choice of one value rather than another."'
The neutral principles theory fails to provide guidance to judges in
making initial determinations of which controlling principles should
guide their opinions. This theory also fails to provide an adequate basis
for healthy criticism or for determining the correctness of constitutional
decisions. The neutral principles model allows criticism of judges for
failing to apply principles if the principles had been applied previously in
a case that was not relevantly distinguishable. It provides no basis for
criticism, however, because the principles used are not required or even
allowed by the Constitution.45 Accordingly, the neutral principles the-
ory allows judges to decide cases without regard to any standard but
consistency. In a case of first impression, this theory gives judges almost
free reign to determine what is a contribution to rather than a degrada-
tion of society's well-being.
One of the goals of the neutral principles theory is to avoid result-
oriented decisions. The notion of a result-oriented decision has acquired
very bad connotations. These connotations have developed because the
notion is often associated with judges striving to impose results dictated
43. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in PRINCIPLES, POLmIcs,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3, 27 (1961).
44. Bork, supra note 7, at 2. The neutral principles method of interpretation takes two
forms. The first requires a judge to commit to the principles used in the case under considera-
tion for all future cases that are not relevantly distinguishable. The judge must determine the
principles to invoke, imagine related future cases, and determine whether the principles would
apply in those future cases. If they would not, the judge must determine if the future cases are
relevantly distinguishable from the present case. If they are not, then the judge may not now
legitimately apply the principles. Tushnet, supra note 41, at 808.
The second form of the neutral principles method of interpretation requires a judge to
consistently apply principles from previous decisions to the one under consideration. When
using this method of interpretation, a judge determines what principles governed previous
cases and whether those principles are consistent with the result intended in the case presently
under consideration. Id at 814.
45. "If neutrality is to serve as a meaningful guide, it must be understood not as a stan-
dard for the content of principles, but rather as a constraint on the process by which principles
are selected, justified and applied." Tushnet, supra note 41, at 806.
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by their own personal value judgments. In constitutional adjudication,
however, deciding cases to achieve a result is not an evil in and of itself.
In this context, courts should strive to decide cases based on the result
dictated by the Constitution.
Another goal of the neutral principles theory is consistency in adju-
dication. If the theory were properly applied, consistency would be
achieved. Consistency in constitutional adjudication is desirable, but
consistency is not the beginning and end of constitutional inquiry. In a
system of law guided by a constitution, the mere requirement that judges
consistently apply principles is not sufficient. The consistent application
must also be constrained by that constitution and its underlying princi-
ples. Otherwise, the law and the constitution would be no more than
what the judges say it is.46
To address the problems resulting from the lack of substantive con-
tent of neutral principles, some nonoriginalists attempt to add substan-
tive content to their theories and to provide a substitute for the
Constitution's "great outlines" and "important objects."'47 Through this
attempt, judges are provided with standards to determine whether a deci-
sion "contributes to the well-being of our society... [and] to the ends of
constitutional government.
48
An example of one such theory employs an economic analysis. This
theory calls for courts to formulate rules designed to maximize efficiency.
In true economic analysis, the bottom line on efficiency must be defined
in terms of dollars and cents.4 9 Many of the interests involved in individ-
ual rights adjudication, however, are not readily, if at all, quantifiable in
economic terms.50 Instead these theorists engage in a cost-benefit analy-
46. Although a particular judge's "sayings" would be consistent, they would still be what
his personal predilections lead him to "say."
47. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
48. Brest, supra note 12, at 226.
49. Shapiro, Richard Posner's Praxis, 48 OHIO S. L. REv. 999, 1001-02 (1989).
50. This method of interpretation has other shortcomings. It has an intellectual and so-
cial heritage which is tied to the "classical eighteenth and nineteenth century economics of
unfettered contract, consumer sovereignty, social Darwinism, and perfect markets." Tribe,
Constitutional Calculus Equal Justice Or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. Rv. 592, 597
(1985). The bias resulting from that heritage inhibits courts from effectively enforcing the
constitutional aspects aimed at advancing fundamental rights and structural concern for demo-
cratic separation of powers. Id. This same bias calls upon courts to apply an ex ante approach
to litigation. Such an approach causes courts to be more concerned with creating rules to
govern the future behavior of society than in doing justice for the actual litigants. Courts view
litigation as an opportunity to formulate legal rules to "order... activities more efficiently in
the future." Id. at 593.
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sis.51 Under this approach, courts maximize the good for the least cost.
Many economic theorists claim that these costs and benefits are deter-
mined by our society's existing rules and practices.52 Thus, the judiciary
should concern itself only with maximizing the predetermined social
good and the effect that its decisions will have on the decisions made by
the political branches.53
The cost-benefit analysis is not an appropriate model for constitu-
tional interpretation when the issues center upon individual rights.54 The
most significant drawback is that the philosophic basis of this analysis is
utilitarianism.55 If a court engages in the assessing and weighing of good
with costs, the tendency would be to consider the collective interests as
good and the individual rights that call for collective concessions as
costs. This alone is not a necessary result of employing a cost-benefit
analysis. Assuming that constitutionally protected individual rights were
selected as good, the cost-benefit analysis could be used to maximize this
good as well as any other. For the reasons discussed below, however, it is
more likely that individual rights will be viewed as costs even when it is
not appropriate to do so.
Citizens in a republican form of government have two classes of
rights or interests-those which they hold individually and those which
they hold collectively.56 There is a tension between these two classes of
rights.5 As the number and scope of individual rights increase, the
number and scope of collective interests decrease, and vice versa.5" Re-
51. See Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Forward: The Court and the Eco-
nomic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1984).
52. Morris, The Exclusionary Rule, Deterrence and Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 57
WASH. L. REv. 647, 657 (1982) ("But economic analyses of this type would insist that they
have no economic criteria for recommending [an outcome to] be considered 'good,' 'optimal,'
or 'desirable.' "); see also Tribe, supra note 50, at 620. Not all economic theorists disavow
normative content to their approach. Morris, at 657 ("A second way of doing economic analy-
sis of law is to make efficiency and normative judgments." (emphasis in original)).
53. Tribe, supra note 50, at 594.
54. Id. at 593. For a defense of the cost-benefit analysis see Easterbrook, supra note 51.
55. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, § 2.3, at 20 (1977).
56. I draw a distinction between individual rights (eg., the right against "unreasonable
searches and seizures") and collective interests (eg., the right to have streets safe from
criminals). Of course, each of us as individuals is affected by detriments to the collective inter-
ests. When collective interests are harmed, however, no one person is affected in any unique
way. Quite to the contrary, when a detriment to an individual right exists, a particular per-
son's interests are affected uniquely.
57. B. PATrERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 57 (1955).
58. The collective good, which I distinguish here from collective interests, is achieved by a
correct determination, delineation, and prioritizing of individual rights and collective interests.
The adoption of the Constitution was an effort to find, define, and incorporate the principles
that are the key to unlocking these answers. Therefore, in the context of constitutional adjudi-
cation, courts should turn to the principles that underlie that document. Because we, like the
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straints must exist for both classes of rights if both are to exist. The more
significant danger in a majoritarian government, however, is that the ma-
jority will overemphasize the majoritarian interests as a collective unit.5 9
There is a potential threat that individual rights may be overempha-
sized to the inappropriate detriment of collective interests. Such a threat,
however, is not likely. The political power of the majority is capable of
subverting individual liberties to the demands of the majority. Accord-
ingly, the prospects of the overemphasis of collective interests is substan-
tially greater than the overemphasis of individual rights. Frequently
individual interests will not seem very weighty when balanced against the
perceived best collective interests of the majority.' Therefore, individual
rights will be sacrificed in the balancing process. This result is not con-
sistent with the Constitution's function in the context of individual rights
adjudication.61 These rights create entitlements in favor of the individual
against the collective interests. When the State denies one a right to
which he or she is entitled, an injustice is done-even if denied for the
benefit of collective interests.62
In the place of cost-benefit analysis, some noninterpretive theorists
would have courts focus on the representative nature of our government
people of 1787, have not yet discovered all of these principles (and have not learned to fully
appreciate those that have been discovered), we do not have all of the right answers. See infra
notes 190-271 and accompanying text. However, constitutional adjudication should be an en-
deavor to continue the process of discovery and implementation.
59. B. PATTERSON, supra note 57, at 57. In his 1930 book entitled Liberty, Everett Mar-
tin aptly concludes:
The psychological fact is that to the mass of men, acting as a whole, liberty is primar-
ily the removal of restraint on crowd behavior, and what crowds call liberty is not
liberty for the individual: it is liberty for the crowd to act without considering the
results of its behavior on other people.
E. MARTIN, LIBERTY 10 (1930).
60. Initially, encroachments into individual rights in the name of collective interests may
be miniscule, but such encroachments may mark an odious beginning to further encroach-
ments. "It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but
illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely: by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure." Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (emphasis added).
61. See comments by James Madison at the introduction of the Bill of Rights:
If [the first ten Amendments] are incorporated into the Constitution, independent
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of
those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power
in the Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroach-
ment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of
rights.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
62. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 199 (1978).
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in formulating rules for individual rights adjudication.6 3 These theorists
assert that whenever courts determine the constitutionality of govern-
mental action, they assign institutional authority and responsibility to the
affected government area." Accordingly, in making decisions that affect
the other branches of government, courts should take the other branches
of the government seriously. As a corollary, these theorists limit the ju-
dicial branch to intervening in other branches' decisions only when there
is a malfunction in the democratic process that renders the political
branches not "deserving of trust."65
63. See J. ELY, supra note 2; Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a
Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. Ciii. L. Rav. 366 (1983). Dean Ely is among the
most noted of this group of theorists. The central premise of his theory is a perceived dichot-
omy of functions between the judiciary and the representative branches of government. He
claims to respect this dichotomy by a "general theory... that bounds judicial review under the
Constitution's open-ended provisions by insisting that it can appropriately concern itself only
with questions of participation, and not with the substantive merits of the political choice
under attack." J. ELY, supra note 2, at 181. Accordingly, when judicial intervention is appro-
priate, the courts fulfill this function by policing the process of decision-making and leaving the
policy choices to the other two branches of government. Id at 73-75, 77-88.
Dean Ely concedes that the drafters of the open-ended provisions of the Constitution
contemplated judicial value choices. Id at 102. However, he claims that this judicial power is
contrary to the concepts of our representative democracy and concludes that a method of
interpretation that reconciles this conflict is needed. Id. at 101-02. The paradox in Dean Ely's
argument has been noted. The argument "locates judicial authority in the Constitution and
then proceeds on the assumption that the exercise of that authority is fundamentally extra-
constitutional and undemocratic." Estreicher, Platonic Guardians of Democracy: John Hart
Ely's Role For the Supreme Court in the Constitution's Open Texture, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 547,
567 (1981).
Dean Ely's theory and others in its vein are not intended to be general theories of inter-
pretation. They are instead limited to the "open-ended" provisions of the Constitution. J.
ELY, supra note 2, at 181. But see id. at 87-88 (Because of the nature and amount of judicial
controversy which centers upon these provisions (eg., the Ninth Amendment and Clauses
such as Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment), Dean Ely admits that "[o]n my
more expansive days, therefore, I am tempted to claim that the mode of review developed here
represents the ultimate interpretivism.").
64. Komesar, supra note 63. When interpreting the Constitution, it is appropriate to fo-
cus upon the nature of the government it creates. However, for the reasons discussed below,
this focus cannot serve as both the beginning and the end of the inquiry when the issue in-
volved centers upon individual rights.
65. J. ELY, supra note 2, at 103. The actions of other branches of government are consid-
ered as not deserving of trust when:
(1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will
stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a voice or a
vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically dis-
advantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recog-
nize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the protection
afforded other groups by a representative system.
Id. at 103 (emphasis added); see also Komesar, supra note 63, at 373-81.
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This constraint upon the appropriate areas of judicial intervention is
designed to limit judicial discretion in choosing among competing princi-
ples and interests.66 Even if this approach limits judicial discretion by
limiting judicial intervention to areas in which there is a mistrust of the
other branches to act faithfully, it would cost the judiciary a large por-
tion of its traditional role. History and the Supreme Court decision in
Marbury v. Madison 67 established that the role of the judicial branch is to
interpret and apply the Constitution. The exercise of that function did
not and should not now turn on whether the other branches' actions are
trustworthy. To effectively apply the law (including the Constitution),
the branch charged with this duty must have authority to interpret the
law even when no distrust of the other branches exists.6"
Another component of the process-oriented model is its focus upon
the fact that the judiciary faces issues which "vary in the number and
complexity of judicial determinations needed for their complete resolu-
tion."6 9 From this premise, proponents argue that courts should factor
the amount of judicial resources needed to enforce a decision into their
determination of which branches of government are better equipped to
manage the decision.70 Courts should not, however, become preoccupied
in debating the allocation of judicial resources. Their primary concern
should be deciding the issues presented to them. Otherwise, courts may
unnecessarily fail to perform their more important functions of constitu-
tional interpretation and legislative review.71
66. Estreicher, supra note 63, at 563-67. It does not, however, accomplish this goal.
Komesar, supra note 63, at 399 ("[T]he task of policing the political process in fact requires the
judiciary to make difficult and important value judgments and to substitute these judgments
for those made by the legislative process." (emphasis in original)); see also Wellington, supra
note 16, at 501. The initial determination of whether a malfunction in the political process
exists, a function Dean Ely would have the judiciary perform, may involve value determina-
tions. In considering the method of selecting Presidents and the number of Senators from each
state, "it is far from clear how, in many situations, a court can know whether... [a political
process is fair], unless... it develops a theory of political fairness." Wellington, supra note 16,
at 501; see also Sandalow, The Distrust of Politics, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 446, 461-67 (1981).
Furthermore, the cure that the judiciary fashions for the political malfunction may involve
selection among competing values. Wellington, supra note 16, at 501.
67. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
68. See supra notes 15-17.
69. Komesar, supra note 63, at 377.
70. Id. at 378. But Professor Komesar counsels that the answer for a court "(f]aced with
serious doubts about the political process, along with strains on its resources," is not always
acquiescence. Id. at 378 n.30. "[Tihe Court might well respond with a sweeping declaration
that all laws of a particular type are invalid," thus diminishing the strain on judicial resources.
71. I do not contend that the judiciary should not be concerned with the practicalities of
enforcing its decisions. As the retreat from Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), might indicate, even the Supreme Court has no mechanism
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A theory that would have courts focus upon the protection of pro-
cess-based rights has shortcomings that extend beyond the scope of judi-
cial intervention. In the context of individual rights adjudication, such a
theory overemphasizes the representative nature of government. As a
result, courts are required to consider whether its decision would be con-
trary to the will of the majority.72 Even when the judiciary is presumed
to have a "great degree of special competence" to act (e.g., procedural
due process and criminal procedure), the "resolution of the issue cannot
ignore the basic desires and perceptions of the populace."73
When the issues center upon individual rights under the Constitu-
tion, this overemphasis on the representative nature of government is
particularly misplaced.74 One underpinning of the notion that the judici-
to enforce a ruling (even a constitutional one) that is contrary to long-term national sentiment.
The judiciary has neither "the sword [n]or the purse." THE FEDERALIST, supra note 17, at 99.
Lochner has never been formally overruled. But cf West Coast Hotel v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), and Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). In addition, some implica-
tions of Roe have been substantially limited. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109
S. Ct. 3040 (1989). However, resistance to a judicial position does not necessarily spell doom
for a judicial opinion. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its progeny
demonstrate what courts willing to perform their constitutional duties can accomplish even in
the face of substantial resistance. The "Southern Manifesto" is an example of resistance to the
Brown decision. This document was signed by 101 southern Congressmen to assert that they
would work to reverse the decision and to claim that the Brown court abused its judicial au-
thority. The progeny of Brown may not have accomplished all that the deciding courts envi-
sioned or all of the needed changes in the area of race relations. In fact, the Court's more
recent approach to desegregation problems may even be viewed as a retreat from Brown. See
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). But despite significant resistance, and possible re-
trenchment, the Brown progeny have dramatically changed race relations in this country.
72. See, ag., J. ELY, supra note 2, at 103 ("[Vialue determinations are to be made by our
elected representatives, and if in fact most of us disapprove we can vote them out of office.");
see also Komesar, supra note 63, at 374.
73. Komesar, supra note 63, at 379-80; see also Wellington, Common Law Rules and Con-
stitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973). Dean
Wellington argues that courts must impose society's moral principles in adjudication and, in
determining these principles, courts must resort to conventional morality, "for it is there that
society's set of moral principles and ideals are located." Id. at 244. He also argues that the
"Court's task is to ascertain the weight of the principle in conventional morality and to convert
the moral principle into a legal one by connecting it with the body of constitutional law." Id
at 284.
74. As Laurence Tribe notes:
[A]ttempts to ground constitutional rights... in conventional morality.., have
inherently limited power. For we are talking, necessarily, about rights of individuals
or groups against the larger community, and against the majority.... [C]ourts-and
all who take seriously their constitutional oaths-must ultimately define and defend
rights against government in terms independent of consensus or majority will.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 896 (1978) (emphasis in original) ("Indeed, if
there really were consensual values of a determinable, helpful sort, there would probably be
little need for the Court to enforce them frequently against electorally accountable officials.");
see also Perry, Noninterpretive Review, supra note 2, at 284.
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ary should have limited review is that courts should not act contrary to
the will of elected representatives. However, the Constitution sanctions
many practices which are countermajoritarian.7" More important, the
emphasis upon populist desires ignores the fact that the Constitution and
its underlying principles function to protect individuals and political mi-
norities from the "basic desires and perceptions of the populace."76
It makes "[n]o sense to use value judgments of the majority to pro-
tect minorities from the value judgments of the majority.""7 The Consti-
tution protects individuals and minorities from the choices of the
majority against infringement of protected interests.78 It is no answer to
say the political minority is protected from oppression because the electo-
rate may "vote [the rule makers] out of office."' 7 9 Unless the oppression
forbidden by the Constitution is unpopular, the rule-makers most often
would not be voted out of office.
Other nonoriginalist theorists decry attempts to tie constitutional in-
terpretation to any national consensus, past or present. They contend
that, with the possible exception of the values included in the Constitu-
tion, there is not and has not been a defensible and definable national
consensus.8 0 Instead, these theorists would have judges play a prophetic
role in determining and shaping evolving moral growth."' They argue
that there is a functional support for their thesis-moral growth is better
than moral stagnation or decay." This is hardly a controversial proposi-
tion. A legitimate complaint, however, is that these theorists allow the
75. Wellington, supra note 16, at 488. For example, the Constitution does not provide for
the direct popular election of Presidents. Also, Senators, chosen by electorates of varying
sizes, each have one vote in the United States Senate. In addition, much legislative practice
fosters dilution of the concept of majority rule (ag., seniority systems, lobbying, and staff
members with significant influence). Id. at 487-92.
76. Komesar, supra note 63, at 380.
77. J. ELY, supra note 2, at 69. Dean Ely would limit application of the above-stated
maxim of interpretation to the protection of minorities "systematically disadvantag[ed] ... out
of simple hostility or a prejudiceo." Id. at 103. However, when the issue involves the individ-
ual rights guaranteed by the Constitution, it should make no difference whether it is one of
these types of minorities or merely a political minority. At the heart of our Constitution is the
notion that certain rights are immune from infringement even when the government is acting
on behalf of what is perceived to be the general welfare and the will of the majority. A. KELLY
& W. HARBISON, supra note 13, at 38. There must be a buffer between the value judgment of
the majority and the protected interests or there is no true constitutional "right." "The nerve
of a claim of right.., is that an individual is entitled to protection against the majority even at
the cost of the general interest." R. DWORKIN, supra note 62, at 146.
78. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 62, at 132-33; see also Wellington, supra note 16, at 500.
79. J. ELY, supra note 2, at 103.
80. See, e.g., Perry, Noninterpretive Review, supra note 2, at 283-88.
81. This prophecy cannot be based on any view of a future consensus because these theo-
rists reject this possibility. Id
82. Id. at 288-96.
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judiciary to set the tone for and define this moral growth without the
constraint of constitutional principles.8 3
According to these theorists, the constraint on the judiciary's power
derives from the power of Congress to limit federal jurisdiction, includ-
ing that of the Supreme Court.84 This limitation, however, ignores the
very nature of the impropriety of inappropriate judicial review and pro-
vides no readily available solutions to the problems created. A court, in
the context of constitutional adjudication, may not rely upon norms that
are not contained in or authorized by the Constitution. Such norms
should not be the basis of even one judicial opinion in the context of
constitutional adjudication.
Even if the possibility of one inappropriately decided case is insuffi-
cient cause to reject this approach, what happens after the case has been
decided? Some may argue the decision is only "law" as between the par-
ties and not binding on other potential actors.8 5 The overemphasis of
this fact, however, is inconsistent with government under the rule of law
in at least two respects. First, the "justice" that is meted out to litigants
would depend upon the fortuity of whether they pressed their claim
before or after Congress limited jurisdiction. As a result, identically situ-
ated litigants would receive different results-not because the substantive
rules under which they operate change, but because the courts' jurisdic-
tion would now be limited.86 Second, the approach fosters the idea that
future actors should feel free to ignore judicial pronouncements simply
83. This approach fosters a society in which the "determinative norms derive ... from the
judge's own moral vision." Id at 324.
84. Id. at 331-43. A substantial amount of debate surrounds the authority of Congress to
limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and lower federal courts because of a substantive
disagreement over the judiciary's constitutional decisions. See J. ELY, supra note 2, at 46;
Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498,
518-30 (1974); Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rv. 157, 171-73 (1960).
85. See, eg., Perry, Noninterpretive Review, supra note 2, at 335-36.
86. There is a difference between this situation and one in which the substantive law
changes. Under the approach advocated by these theorists, the different results would not be
justified by the change in the substantive rules, but by the fact that the elected representatives
should be able to prevent the courts from acting in contravention of the representatives' will,
unless these representatives have exceeded their constitutional authority. These theorists and I
agree on this point. However, these theorists would require the elected representatives to
await judicial action and then respond by limiting jurisdiction in future cases. In many in-
stances this judicial action contravenes the decisions of the elected representatives (eg., when
legislation is declared unconstitutional). The better approach would be that courts may not, in
contravention of executive action or legislative enactment (including delegation), enforce rules
that do not advance underlying principles of the Constitution. This would lead to the same
result that these theorists admit is correct, but would not create the anomaly of the inappropri-
ately decided opinion.
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because the courts no longer have the jurisdictional authority to pro-
nounce the action wrongful.8 7 Neither of these results are appropriate in
a system that purports to adhere to the rule of law.88
II. Originalism and Constitutional Interpretation
In Section I, I attempted to explain why some of the major alterna-
tives to originalism are inappropriate for constitutional adjudication of
individual rights. In this Section, I will review the various forms of
originalism and attempt to show why one form, moderate intentionalism,
best serves individual rights adjudication.
It is tempting to argue that originalism would eliminate judicial ac-
tivism. Such an argument might win many converts, but would be false.
Originalism, like noninterpretivism, is consistent with judicial activism. 9
Under originalistic theories of interpretation, courts must determine and
apply the fundamental principles and values of our society as incorpo-
rated in the Constitution. "[T]his task will inevitably eventuate in activ-
ism... [but] it will be a constitutional activism that does not lead to a
'depreciation of the Constitution.' "90
87. "Of course, there is good reason for treating a single decision as generally binding [on
potential future litigants] .... but only when the Court retains jurisdiction to decide future,
similar cases in the same way." Perry, Noninterpretive Review, supra note 2, at 336.
88. These considerations aside, the removal of jurisdiction not only prevents the judiciary
from making inappropriate decisions in the now-taboo area, it also stagnates the law after an
admittedly inappropriately decided case. This loss of jurisdiction also prevents courts from
making future constitutional pronouncements on legitimate, constitutionally based factors. Fi-
nally, the approach ignores the effect that the one inappropriately decided case will have on
state court adjudication of federal constitutional claims. Are state courts to ignore this deci-
sion? Or should they be bound to continue to apply a decision that is based on inappropriate
factors?
89. See, e.g., Bork, Forward to G. MCDOWELL, supra note 3, at xi. I am reluctant to
make such an admission. The term "judicial activism" has developed such negative connota-
tions that this admission may well be viewed as a condemnation of originalism. However, the
activism referred to here is tied to and limited by the demands of the Constitution and its
underlying principles. In this respect it differs from noninterpretive activism tied to the per-
sonal and political agenda of the deciding judge, which has been rightfully criticized.
90. G. McDOWELL, supra note 3, at 36. The acceptance of originalism as the binding
theory of interpretation requires the acceptance of an objective, intelligible Constitution. It
does not, however, require acceptance of the notion that the task of making sense of the Con-
stitution will be an easy one:
[L]ooking for guidance in the Constitution requires only a belief in the possibility of
ascertaining what the Constitution means; those who believe it can mean nothing in
particular cannot take it seriously as law. Those who take it seriously as law must
believe it means something, however much they may debate that meaning or oppose
it politically.
S. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANs 36 (1984).
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A. Strict Originalism and the Constitution
Originalists are divided into two major camps, strict and moderate.
These camps are further subdivided into textualists and intentionalists.91
Strict originalists in the textual faction advocate deciding constitutional
issues according to the original meaning of the text of the Constitution
and amendments. The strict originalists in the intentionalist faction ad-
vance constitutional decision-making based on the original intent of the
relevant group or groups of authors.9 2
Strict textualists are concerned only with the meaning of the text as
written. This meaning is to be derived from the text without recourse to
the reasons for or the underlying principles supporting the inclusion of
the various provisions. This textual ajpproach limits the application of
the text to the specific instances to which it applied at the time of draft-
ing.93 The original meaning of the text is to be determined by the ac-
cepted meaning at the time of drafting. A paradigmatic canon of strict
textualism is the "plain meaning rule." 94 This rule requires that the text
be given the meaning it would have had for a "normal speaker of [the]
English language under the [linguistic and social] circumstances in which
it is used." 95
Strict intentionalists employ several means of determining intent.
Some means include examining: the incidents that may have prompted
the inclusion of the text and the language of the text; the undesirable
consequences that were to have been avoided; and the original specific
applications of the text. Strict intentionalists would consider constitu-
tional interpretation illegitimate if it were to go beyond the specific con-
91. Brest, supra note 12, at 209-10.
92. See supra note 9.
93. Brest, supra note 12, at 208-09, 214-16.
94. There are those who deny that the constitutional text has a "plain meaning." See
Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Selection: A View From the Federalist Pa-
pers, 61 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1669 (1988); Allen, The Federalist's Plain Meaning: A Reply to
Tushnet, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1701 (1988).
95. Brest, supra note 12, at 206 (quoting Holmes, The Theory of Interpretation, 12 HARV.
L. REv. 417, 419 (1899)). Placing language in this historical context is essential to under-
standing and application of the rule:
[W]e ought to expect the past to differ from the present. Even though the language
of the founders can seem deceptively modem on commonplace topics, we should
expect it to convey presuppositions about life and society that we no longer share and
that we can understand and appreciate only through patient effort.
Murrin, Can Liberals Be Patriots? Natural Right, Virtue, and Moral Sense in the America of
George Mason and Thomas Jefferson, in NATURAL RIGHTS AND NATURAL LAW: THE LEG-
ACY OF GEORGE MASON, at 51 (R. Davidow ed. 1986); see also Letter from James Madison to
Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), quoted in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 464 (M. Farrand ed. 1966) ("What a metamorphosis would be produced in the code of
law if all its ancient phraseology were to be taken in its modem sense!").
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ceptions held by the group deemed relevant.9 6
There are several deficiencies in strict originalistic models. These
deficiencies cause the models to fall short of proper constitutional adjudi-
cation in the context of individual rights. 97 The original specific applica-
tions of the text and the specific intentions were driven by the
circumstances that faced the people of that earlier society and their effort
to adhere to underlying principles incorporated into the Constitution.98
Some of the conditions and operative factors affecting the underlying
principles have changed. 99 In light of these changes, it may be necessary
to vary the text's specific application in order to advance the underlying
principles that originally warranted that particular application.lc ° As
the Supreme Court stated in Brown v. Board of Education,10 1 "In ap-
proaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was
written." °102 Because we cannot turn back the clock, a strict adherence to
originalism "require[s] that we find legislation valid unless it violates val-
96. See Monaghan, supra note 2, at 379-80.
97. Further, these methods of interpretation do not coincide with the original interpretive
intent and accordingly are not appropriate for originalist adjudication. See infra note 136; see
also Brest, supra note 12, at 216 ("The adopters may have understood that, even as to instances
to which they believe the clause ought or ought not to apply, further thought by themselves or
others committed to its underlying principle might lead them to change their minds.").
98. Cf United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) ("[T]he Framers were men who
focused on the wrongs of that day but who intended the Fourth Amendment to safeguard
fundamental values which would far outlast the specific abuses which gave it birth."); Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 88-90 (1970) ("In short, while sometime in the 14th century the size of
the jury at common law came to be fixed generally at 12, that particular feature of the jury
system appears to have been a historical accident, unrelated to the great purposes which gave
rise to the jury in the first place." (footnotes omitted)); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. I
(1985). In Garner, the Court rejected the notion that it should rely exclusively on the practice
at common law at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment in defining its applica-
tion today. The Court stated that, "[b]ecause of sweeping change in the legal and technologi-
cal context, reliance on the common-law rule in this case would be a mistaken literalism that
ignores the purposes of a historical inquiry." Id. at 13.
99. Hamburger, The Constitution's Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MIcH. L. REv.
239 (1989).
100. Because the amendment process cannot sustain the entire burden of adaptation if the
Constitution is to remain a viable document, strict originalism might eventually raise serious
questions about the need to introduce a new constitutional system. Sandalow, supra note 2, at
1046. But de-emphasis upon the Constitution may also raise substantial question as to the
validity and viability of our system. "The refusal of some to acknowledge that [the original
understanding of the Constitution can answer interpretive questions] ultimately threatens the
stability of the Constitution either as a symbol or as an important societal institution." Clin-
ton, supra note 9, at 1264. Moderate originalism strikes the appropriate balance between these
two extremes.
101. 341 U.S. 483 (1954).
102. Id. at 492 (footnote omitted).
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ues that are both old-fashioned and seriously outmoded."'
0 3
Those who would bind judges by a static interpretation of the origi-
nal specific application of intent or text fail to consider that the Constitu-
tion was drafted with certain underlying principles that justified that
original application. If constitutional interpretation is limited to the
original application of the Constitution, without resort to the underlying
principles, the very principles of the Constitution would be sacrificed in
the name of the original application.
As a general rule, strict originalists deny that the original specific
application of the Constitution may legitimately change in modem-day
adjudication." ° However, not all strict originalists draw such an abso-
lute line. Some admit that change is appropriate when the circumstance
was not envisioned under the original Constitution.10 5 They stop short,
however, of an interpretative model that would allow courts "to reach
results which are contrary to the Framers' known intent .... 106 They
would allow enhancements to the original application only when there is
not sufficient evidence that the issue was originally conceived and of how
it was resolved."0 7
The strict intentionalists are correct in arguing that some of the pro-
visions of the Constitution are inflexible. Some provisions define such
requirements as the age of the President, the number of representatives to
be elected from each state, and the process for the enactment of laws.
Such specific and clear provisions are primarily procedural in nature.'08
For purposes of clarity and stability, such provisions were not designed
to be interpreted so as to change with the evolution of our society.
Government could not effectively and efficiently operate if constant
bickering over the meaning of procedural provisions occurred. In the
103. Tushnet, supra note 41, at 787. Strict originalism not only prevents courts from vindi-
cating rights that are now implicit in the original underlying principles of the Constitution, but
it may also unduly restrain the other branches from acting in areas where societal changes
have occurred since the drafting of the Constitution. Under these changed circumstances
these governmental branches should be authorized and competent to act. Id
104. See, eg., Monaghan, supra note 2, at 279-80.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 380 (emphasis in original).
107. See, eg., id at 379.
108. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1; U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7;
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. But see Peller, The Metaphysics ofAmerican Law, 73 CALIF. L.
REv. 1151, 1174 (1985):
[E]ven a seemingly determinate clause such as the minimum age for presidents re-
mains indeterminate. It is possible that the age thirty-five signified to the Framers a
certain level of maturity rather than some intrinsically significant number of years. If
so, it is open to argument whether the translation in our social universe of the clause
still means thirty-five years of age.
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context of individual rights, however, the need for stability and predict-
ability is not as great as in the procedural context."° In this context, the
"right" resolution is more important than efficiency. Just as with the
procedural provisions, the wording of the provisions that are relevant to
individual rights indicates the appropriate method of interpretation for
those provisions. Because the provisions are not written in clear, direct,
and specific terms, the text implies that a moderate originalistic interpre-
tation is appropriate. 110
B. Moderate Originalism and the Constitution
Moderate originalism is more flexible and allows the Constitution to
grow. It thus avoids some of the shortcomings of strict originalism.
Growth under a theory of moderate originalism, however, differs from
noninterpretivistic growth.111 "[Moderate originalistic] growth is made
possible.., by the Constitution's 'briefly indicating certain fundamental
principles whose general purport is clear enough but whose specific im-
plications for each age were meant to be determined in contemporary
context.'... Noninterpretivistic growth takes place along different lines;
109. There are two major types of constitutional provisions that relate to individual rights.
One type of provision limits the powers of the State and grants rights to individuals and
against majority rule. These features of the Constitution protect individuals or political minor-
ities from the official acts of the majority or those elected (or appointed) to represent their
interests. See, e.g., most provisions of the Bill of Rights; U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (Writ of
Habeas Corpus is not to be suspended except as defined in the Constitution); U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 9, cl. 3 (no ex post facto laws or Bills of Attainder); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I(states
may not issue ex post facto laws, Bills of Attainder, or laws that impair contracts); U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (trial by jury in the state where the crime was allegedly committed);
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (no religious test to qualify for office of "Public Trust" of the United
States); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (Due Process Clause). The second type of provision limits
the powers of the State, but is more concerned with setting standards than with directly grant-
ing rights. The First Amendment contains an example of both of these features. The Free
Exercise Clause of this amendment is a right-conferring provision. However, the Establish-
ment Clause is more concerned with limiting governmental power and setting standards of
proper governmental conduct. Of course, liberties may indirectly flow from the limitation or
denial of the powers of the government. These rights, however, are generally collective in
nature and should be treated differently. See Simien, The Interrelationship of the Scope of the
Fourth Amendment and Standing to Object to Unreasonable Searches, 41 ARK. L. REV. 487,
566-74 (1988).
110. Of course, this is not a universal rule. There are instances of individual rights guaran-
tees where the language is very clear, specific, and direct. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I
("Congress shall make no law .... ). The purpose of this Article is not to critique or analyze
those cases in which such language has not been given clear import. Instead, its purpose is to
demonstrate that in the context of the numerous individual rights provisions that are less clear,
moderate intentionalism and resort to natural law theories are appropriate and necessary.
111. See supra notes 1-88 and accompanying text regarding criticism of noninterpretivistic
growth.
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it is extra-constitutional in substance."'1 2
When courts engage in moderate originalistic interpretation, they
determine the original meaning of a constitutional provision based on
either the original meaning of the text or the original intent.1 ' This
meaning is determined within: (1) an historical perspective, by looking
to the general nature of the entire document," 4 (2) the specific concerns
that were to be addressed and the original application of the provision,
and (3) the nature of the society that drafted the provision, including the
prevailing political philosophy. Most important, the moderate originalist
looks to the constitutional principles that originally underlay the relevant
provisions and their specific applications. Accordingly, courts applying
the moderate originalist model must determine how changes in the rele-
vant operative factors might lead to variations from the original applica-
tion of the Constitution in order to advance more effectively the
underlying principles." 5
Under the theory of moderate originalism advocated here, changes
in the operative factors have a different effect on those areas in which the
language is less clear than those in which there are clear and specific
procedural provisions. Provisions relating to individual rights were
112. S. BARBER, supra note 90, at 23 (footnote omitted) (quoting from J. Ely, Constitu-
tional Interpretivism, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 400 (1978)).
113. As with any theory of interpretation, moderate originalism has as many versions as
proponents. The characteristics and content of the theory as described here shall be generally
recognized features, not necessarily containing all of the features of all forms of moderate
originalism, or those with which all moderate originalists would agree.
114. See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTrUTIONAL LAW (1969);
Palmer, Liberties As Constitutional Provisions, in LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY: CONSTITUTION
AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 56 (W. Nelson and R. Palmer eds. 1987).
115. Depending on what underlying principles support the provisions in question, different
operative factors become relevant to this inquiry.
One operative factor that has changed and may affect all constitutional adjudication is the
class of persons to whom constitutional protections extend. "The Constitution was adopted by
propertied, white males who had no strong incentives to attend to the concerns and interests of
the impoverished, the nonwhites, or nonmales. .. ." Simon, supra note 35, at 1492. Another
overriding change in operative factors is that at the time the Constitution was drafted, not only
was slavery sanctioned, it was a significant factor in the socioeconomic fabric of our society.
Slavery had a profound impact on some of the decisions made in Philadelphia. See Diamond,
No Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall's Thesis on the Intent of a Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42
VAND. L. REv. 93 (1989). A civil war and several constitutional amendments have reversed
many of the effects slavery had upon the original intentions. Additional principles have been
incorporated and the application of previously included principles have been molded to more
closely reflect those principles and the changes they have made. See infra note 222 for indica-
tions that the original Framers understood that slavery was inconsistent with many of the
principles upon which our government was established. These changes not only affect the
scope of coverage, but also affect the entire dynamics of the Constitution and our society.
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designed with specific applications.' 1 6 As demonstrated by their vague
terms, however, they were designed to grow and develop as needed to
advance their underlying principles. Therefore, in determining whether
these underlying principles have been satisfied in light of changes in the
operative factors, courts cannot be limited to the original specific applica-
tion. In light of these changes, courts must determine how specific appli-
cations must change in order to advance the original underlying
principles.
Using this model of interpretation, three scenarios are relevant to a
claim that an individual rights guarantee of the Constitution should lead
to a specific result: (1) the interpretation originally was considered as
part of and necessary to the underlying principles; (2) the operative fac-
tors relevant to the provisions in question have changed; and (3) the in-
terpretation might not be justified under either of these scenarios, but for
other reasons is tempting." 7
Interpretation consistent with the original underlying principles
would be appropriate under an originalistic interpretive model. Under
the second scenario, the Constitution must be interpreted to advance its
original underlying principles. When the operative factors relevant to
the underlying principles have changed, however, there must be changes
in the court's interpretation to assure that these principles are advanced.
Under the last scenario, there is no valid basis under moderate original-
ism for a change in the interpretation."
8
Moderate originalism involves more than a determination of the
original meaning and specific application of the Constitution at its incep-
tion. This meaning and application originally attempted to advance prin-
ciples that were believed to pre-date and exist independently of the
Constitution. Moderate originalism requires a search for these underly-
ing principles. In other words, courts should attempt to determine what
116. For example, the primary considerations in the addition of the Fourth Amendment
were the then-recent experiences of the colonists with the British writs of assistance.
117. For discussion of other theories of interpretation, see supra notes 2-111 and accompa-
nying text.
118. Under moderate originalism, technological advances are also relevant to interpreta-
tion, but in a different manner. Technological advances may support the development of new
means of protecting original underlying principles. As our society advances technologically, it
may be necessary for courts to meet new challenges to the underlying principles. See, e.g.,
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). There can be no meaningful protection of these
underlying principles unless they are also protected from intrusions by means which were not
originally envisioned. Technological changes might also affect the nature of society and the
operative factors relevant to the original underlying principles. As a result, in order to ad-
vance these principles, the specific application of the Constitution might have to change to
address these differences.
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the text was designed to achieve in the broader sense rather than merely
its specific application,119 and that the results reached by courts advance
those original underlying principles.
120
Moderate originalism recognizes that the Constitution is not a docu-
ment once written and unchanging. As John Agresto states:
The highest and most complex attribute of judicial review is its
potential ability to help the nation as a whole govern itself and
direct its progress in the light of constitutional principles; not only
principles that need to be applied to new circumstances, but princi-
ples that-like the colonial ideas of sovereignty and equal right and
even constitutionalism itself-must grow, develop, and expand.
12 1
Moderate originalism is not without its critics. Much of the criticism,
however, spills over from a critique of strict originalism and a failure
either to perceive or to admit the differences between strict and moderate
originalism.' 22 As an example, moderate originalism would allow an in-
terpreter to consider a change in societal attitude about equality as a
change in some of the operative factors that affect the underlying princi-
119. "All law, the Constitution not excepted, is a purposive ordering of norms. Textual
language embodies one or more purposes, and the text may be understood and usefully applied
only if its purposes are understood." Monaghan, supra note 2, at 353.
120. How then would a judge who wanted to be guided by the Constitution deal with
the indeterminacies of the privileges and immunities clause, the due process clause,
and the Ninth Amendment? ... Try to ascertain the general values the framers
sought to serve either through specific clauses or the Constitution as a whole, and
construe the rules accordingly in changing circumstances.
S. BARBER, supra note 90, at 25-26.
121. J. AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTrUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 54-55
(1984). In further defense of moderate originalism, then Justice, now Chief Justice Rehnquist
of the United States Supreme Court stated:
The framers of the Constitution wisely spoke in general language and left to suc-
ceeding generations the task of applying that language to the unceasingly changing
environment in which they would live.... Merely because a particular activity may
not have existed when the Constitution was adopted, or because the framers could
not have conceived of a particular method of transacting affairs, cannot mean that
general language in the Constitution may not be applied to such course of conduct.
Where the framers of the Constitution have used general language, they have given
latitude to those who would later interpret the instrument to make that language
applicable to cases that the framers might not have foreseen.
Rehnquist, supra note 27, at 694. But see S. BARBER, supra note 90, at 19 n. 12 (describing
Justice Rehnquist's views as strict originalism).
122. Professor Simon notes the primary criticism that nonoriginalists have for moderate
originalism:
Suppose, for example, that the creators of the fourteenth amendment wanted to
achieve the goal of "equtl treatment" for blacks and whites, but believed that segre-
gation of facilities was not unequal. If a later generation believed that segregation as
it had developed did not provide equal treatment, is it more faithful to the framers'
intended meaning to permit or prohibit the disagreeable practices? Should the inter-
preter rely on current or past interpretations of the "equal treatment" concept?
Simon, supra note 35, at 512.
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ple of equality. A moderate originalistic interpreter also would consider
changes in the socioeconomic environment in which the question of
equality must be decided. At one time separate but equal facilities may
have been equal. Because of economic growth and development and the
value of interaction in a new economic and social atmosphere, however,
separate has become unequal. The factors for determining equality in
1868 were different from those of a society in which many intangible
factors have a significant impact upon the ability of one to effectively
operate in and advance within that society. It is only by considering the
changes in these operative factors that a modem court may determine if
the state is denying a citizen the principle inherent in the requirement of
equal protection of the laws. Changes in these types of operative factors
are not ignored under moderate originalism. 123
There are other criticisms of moderate originalism, but they too are
more appropriately applicable to strict originalistic approaches. Some
commentators argue that it is impossible to achieve the necessary deter-
minacy about original application of the Constitution for originalism to
work. 24 It is not necessary, however, for a moderate originalistic inter-
preter to determine the original constitutional application. It is far more
important to determine the underlying principles in the original docu-
ment and later amendments. This inquiry does not require as much pre-
cision as one in which courts are required to enforce only the original
specific applications of the Constitution. 125
Originalism is also criticized for its reliance upon history. Critics
charge that when judges rely upon history they are vesting themselves
123. "[O]nly [the] ... great outlines [of the Constitution are to]... be marked, its impor-
tant objects designated .... That this idea was entertained by the framers of the American
constitution, is not only to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the lan-
guage." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the Court struck down the
use of poll taxes in state elections. It did so despite the fact that at the time of the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment poll taxes were commonplace. The Court reasoned that it has
never been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we have restricted
due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits
of fundamental rights. Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of
the Equal Protection Clause do change.
Id. at 669 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
As indicated at supra note 12, this Article is limited to a discussion of the appropriate
interpretive model for the original Constitution and Bill of Rights. Reference to other provi-
sions such as the Fourteenth Amendment are merely to demonstrate the application of the
model rather than to indicate that the interpretive model advocated here is appropriate for
these other provisions.
124. See, eg., Tushnet, supra note 41, at 799-800.
125. Determining the original application of the Constitution would, of course, be useful.
This would provide additional insight into the Constitution's underlying principles.
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with the discretion that originalism was designed to limit.12 6 However,
[o]ur system... provides no way to enforce constitutional theory
coercively; and if it did, the problem of how to constrain the con-
strainers would merely shift up one level. In consequence, consti-
tutional theory can constrain judges only by creating standards for
criticism and, to the extent that the standards are internalized by
the judges, for self-criticism.
127
Within the secular world, there must be some vehicle by which disputes
are resolved or else government by the rule of law cannot exist. In a
government of multiple branches, this resolution is most efficiently made
when one branch is charged with the responsibility. It would not be pos-
sible to allow two (or more) branches to exercise authority to resolve
disputes over the application of laws-including disputes over what the
Constitution requires. If more than one branch had such authority, it
would create the substantial probability of a dispute between the
branches. Accordingly, one branch must have the singular authority to
act as final arbiter of whether the government has exceeded its
authority.
1 28
There is no method to constrain unconditionally the discretion of
that branch of government ultimately vested with the power of interpret-
ing the Constitution. 129 Constraint results from guidelines, and guide-
lines result from the use of a theory of constitutional interpretation tied
to principles. These principles exist as standards to those who must de-
cide and as bases upon which to critique their decisions. Accordingly,
we should be less concerned with trying to absolutely constrain judges
and more concerned with discovering appropriate principles of constitu-
tional interpretation. Proper judicial interpretation and constraint will
flow from the discovery, promulgation, and acceptance of these
principles.
Moderate originalism is also criticized for not providing sufficient
guidance to judges searching for answers in constitutional adjudication.
Just as more than one principle might explain a judicial decision or series
of decisions, many underlying principles may be construed to explain
126. See Tushnet, supra note 41, at 799-800.
127. Id. at 784 n.9.
128. Of course, a branch other than the judiciary could have been selected for this pur-
pose. However, under our system, the judiciary was selected. See supra notes 15-17 and ac-
companying text.
129. For a more complete discussion of whether judges do and ought to have discretion,
see H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, Ch. VII, 121-50 (1961); R. DWORKIN, supra note 62, at
14-130; Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. Rnv. 949 (1985); Greenawalt,
Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest For The Fetters That Bind Judges, 75
COLUM. L. Rlv. 359 (1975).
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constitutional choices.13 This argument has two implications-that it is
impossible or overly difficult to ascertain the underlying principles of the
Constitution and, again, that judges are not sufficiently constrained."3
Admittedly, it would be difficult to determine original underlying
principles in all instances.1 32 Even contemporaries to the Constitution
had differing views about the document's meaning. This divergence in
views, however, may not be so significant. Although the constitutional
contemporaries might have disagreed over the specific application of the
Constitution, this disagreement may have been bonded in the same un-
derlying principles. Because modem courts should be more concerned
with the underlying principles than the specific application, this diver-
gence is not inconsistent with moderate originalism.
Further, many provisions were addressed adequately in the contem-
porary writings to make clear their underlying principles. The prece-
dents of courts closer in time to the drafting of the Constitution are also
helpful in reconstructing the original underlying principles. Many provi-
sions may be reconstructed without significant difficulty based on this
evidence. 133 If nothing else, courts have the text of the Constitution from
which to attempt to derive these principles. 1 3  There will be times when
the text will not be sufficiently revealing. An in-depth historical and
philosophical inquiry into the society that adopted the Constitution,
however, will also aid in the inquiry.
135
Moderate originalism does not tie interpretation of the Constitution
to the meaning it had in 1787 (or when the relevant amendments were
incorporated). Because the overriding feature of this interpretive model
is that judicial interpretation must advance the original principles under-
lying the Constitution, however, it leads to more consistent results than
those interpretive models in which the original Constitution is not given
binding effect. Despite this consistency, judges are required to consider
changes in the operative factors relevant to underlying principles. For
that reason, this method of interpretation is better able to serve the evolv-
ing needs of the nation than strict originalism. These advantages provide
130. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at 1061.
131. See the preceding discussion ofjudicial constraint, which will not be further addressed
here.
132. See C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 155-61 (1969).
133. Monaghan, supra note 2, at 377.
134. "[Ihe language of the constitution itself remains. Whatever the difficulties, that lan-
guage constitutes the best evidence of original intention." Id.
135. Even if it were conceded that in some instances courts might fail in their attempts to
determine underlying principles, they would at least be striving for an appropriate resolution.
To paraphrase a well-known adage, "there's no surer route to failure than not trying."
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significant practical reasons to support moderate originalistic adjudica-
tion in individual rights litigation.
For an originalist, however, the advantages of moderate originalism
are not sufficient. Resort must also be had to the original interpretive
intent. It would be a hypocrisy to advocate the binding nature of the
original Constitution and yet ignore the original interpretive intent.
136
There is substantial evidence that the original interpretive intent was that
the Constitution should be interpreted in a moderate originalistic fash-
ion.1 37 Moreover, as discussed below, the better evidence indicates that
moderate intentionalistic interpretation was the preferred approach by
the Framers.
1 38
1. The Constitution as a Statute for Purposes of Interpretation
The idea of constitutional limitation on governmental power was
not an invention of our founding fathers. Resort to "constitutional law"
was a common practice in English political controversy long before the
Declaration of Independence.1 39 The innovation of American constitu-
tional law was the reduction of a constitution to a single written docu-
ment. 11 Accordingly, there was no precedent on how such a document
should be interpreted. It is fairly well settled, however, that at the time
of the Constitution's drafting and ratification, the prevailing view was
136. Brest, supra note 12, at 215-20; Powell, supra note 12, at 886; Nelson, The Eighteenth
Century Constitution as a Basis for Protecting Personal Liberty, in LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY:
CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 15, 47 (1987).
137. See infra notes 139-66 and accompanying text.
138. However, this intentionalistic approach placed a heavy reliance upon the text in deter-
mining intent. See infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
139. See C. BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE 452-53, 482-84, 495-99 (1956). Except
in rare cases, however, under English "constitutional law," the English judiciary did not nor-
mally declare statutes to be void. But see Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. la, 77 Eng. Rep. 377
(1608) and Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610).
140. Powell, supra note 12, at 902. The history of constitutional law, however, depended
heavily upon written documents, in part explaining the trust that our nation's founders placed
in the power of the written word to protect rights and limit government. As Professor Clinton
points out:
The ultimate faith of the framers of the Constitution in the power of the written word
is not surprising. Eighteenth-century American society emerged from western Euro-
pean traditions in which written documents played powerful roles in controlling
human behavior and shaping the structure of, and limits on, governmental power.
Biblical texts and their interpretation had stirred major revolutions in both thought
and deed in Europe. The English legal tradition, while lacking a formal written con-
stitution, had long relied on written documents to limit the prerogative of the Crown
and therefore the operation of government itself.
Clinton, supra note 9, at 1187 (footnotes omitted).
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that the Constitution should be interpreted as a statute. 14 1 Therefore a
brief review of the prevailing thoughts on statutory interpretation is
necessary.
2. Protestantism, Enlightenment, and Statutory Interpretation
At the time of the drafting and ratification of the Constitution,
"[t]he cultural influences of Enlightenment rationalism and British Prot-
estantism combined in an unlikely alliance to engender a suspicion of any
sort of interpretation at all."' 4 2 A primary theme of the Protestant Ref-
ormation was that the word of God, as contained in the text of the Scrip-
ture, was not to be interpreted."' The Protestant bias against
interpretation was reinforced by the Enlightenment movement. The
leaders of the Enlightenment movement saw many evils in interpretation.
They felt that Scriptural interpretation led to the "theological absurdities
and religious oppression perpetrated by the established churches, and
saw the niggling interpretation of complicated or obscure laws as a relic
of feudal misrule and political tyranny."' It was thought that interpre-
tation of Scripture, so prevalent in the Catholic tradition, was a corrup-
tion of the Word of God as contained in the Scriptures.1"'
This distrust of interpretation spilled over into the political sphere.
It was felt that the "advantages of a known and written law would be lost
if the law's meaning could be twisted by means of judicial construction.
* . .[T]he judiciary could undermine the legislative prerogatives of the
people's representatives by engaging in the corruptive process of inter-
preting legislative text."'"
141. As a result, the common-law statutory interpretive influences shaped original consti-
tutional interpretive theory. See Powell, supra note 12, at 894, 903-05; Berger, supra note 12,
at 314. Even the Anti-Federalists agreed that the Constitution should be analogized to a stat-
ute for the purposes of interpretation. Powell, supra note 12, at 905. But see P. BOBBrrr,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 10 (1982) (concluding that British rules of statutory interpretation
did not play a substantial part in shaping original interpretive intent).
It was not until 1798 that there was any widely accepted notion that the Constitution
should be viewed as a compact (contract) rather than a statute. The delay in the emergence of
this theory of the Constitution was, at least in part, due to the fact that during the drafting and
ratification stages neither Anti-Federalists nor the Federalists viewed the Constitution as a
compact. Powell, supra note 12, at 904-05.
142. Powell, supra note 12, at 887. The influences of the Enlightenment movement and
British Protestantism upon American political thought cannot be overemphasized. One or
both "formed part of the mental furniture of virtually all literate Americans" during the early
years of the formation of our country. Id. at 893.
143. See R. BROWN, THE SPIRrr OF PROTESTANTISM 67-68 (1961).
144. Powell, supra note 12, at 892.
145. Id. at 890.
146. Id. at 892.
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It was also thought that judicial interpretation of statutes violated
notions of separation of powers, believed by many to be necessary for
rational and free society.147 But, as a practical matter, disputes within
the temporal world had to be resolved through "the rich common law
tradition of legal interpretation."' 48 According to this tradition, courts
had the authority and the obligation to determine the intention that un-
derlay the text."4 9 As an invention born out of necessity, however, this
interpretation was to be severely limited.
Although few dispute that the courts' authority to interpret statutes
was to be limited, there is a heated debate over the extent and source of
this limitation. At the two extremes in this debate are H. Jefferson Pow-
ell and Raoul Berger.' Professor Powell asserts that the discretion
common law courts exercised in statutory interpretation was limited by
rules that required them to interpret by reference to the "intent" of the
text, without reference to such devices as legislative history.'' On the
other hand, Raoul Berger contends that the discretion of these courts
147. Id. at 892-93.
148. Id. at 894, 897.
The tensions between the anti-interpretive traditions of Protestantism and Enlightenment
and the interpretive tradition of the common law may not have been as strong as might appear.
Despite the rich tradition of the common law, there was still a distrust of judges as interpreters
of the law. The need to resolve disputes, however, even when statutory law may not have
appeared clear forced acceptance of the common law practice. As a result, the recognition of a
final interpretive authority in the common law tradition may have been more a function of the
practical necessity for dispute resolution in the temporal world than an actual disagreement in
principal with the anti-interpretive traditions of Protestantism and Enlightened rationalism.
When issues center upon one's religious or philosophic views of "right" and only a god or
conscience demands justification of one's actions, there is room for individualized interpreta-
tion not subject to review. Disputes within the temporal world, however, are at least two-
sided. Therefore, other than in a system of anarchy, there must be a final arbiter of what is
"right" so that disputes might be resolved.
149. Id. at 894.
150. Compare Powell, supra note 12, with Berger, supra note 12.
151. Powell, supra note 12, at 894-902. Although Professor Powell refers to this approach
as intentionalism, it appears merely to be nonoriginalist textualism in disguise. For a similar
conclusion, see Clinton, supra note 9, at 1187.
Some argue that the care with which the language was drafted and the concealment of the
convention records indicates that the text was to take precedent over intent. See Palmer, supra
note 114, at 141; Powell, supra note 12, at 903. However, these assumptions are not supported
by the history of the Convention. The careful drafting of the language is only evidence that the
drafters understood the importance of language, particularly for the specific, procedural provi-
sions in which much of this care in drafting was used. See discussion supra notes 109-10 and
accompanying text. The primary reason for the concealment of the records after the adjourn-
ment of the Convention was to prevent the Anti-Federalists from abusing them in the antici-
pated struggle over ratification. Clinton, supra note 9, at 1195. During the Convention, the
records were probably concealed in order to facilitate open discussion by the delegates. Id. at
1195 n.60. James Wilson argued in favor of preserving the records of the Convention because
he thought that, "as false suggestions may be propagated, it should not be made impossible to
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was limited because they were required to interpret statutes by resorting
to legislative intent.
152
Although Professor Powell makes an interesting argument, Raoul
Berger has the better point on this issue.153 Professor Powell admits that
at common law, words were to be taken "according to the ... intent of
the parties."' 54 He explains, however, that this does not mean what a
modem-day reader might think. Professor Powell argues that this confu-
sion results from ambiguity in the meaning of the word intent.
This simple principled concealed a significant ambiguity, because
its salient term-intent-was by no means unequivocal in mean-
ing. The English nouns 'intention' and 'intent' were derived from
the Latin intentio, which in medieval usage could refer either to
individual, subjective purpose or to what an external observer
would regard as the purpose of the individual's actions. The Eng-
lish derivatives of intentio inherited a similar ambiguity: the 'in-
tent' or 'intention' of a document could denote either the meaning
that the drafters wished to communicate or the meaning the reader
was warranted in deriving from the text.155
Thus, he concludes that, to understand the import of the common
law's focus on "intent," we must determine in what sense the word itself
was used. 156
Professor Powell goes on to attempt to support his thesis with a
historical study that spans four hundred years.157 From this review, he
contradict them" with the records. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 648 (M. Farrand ed. 1966).
152. Berger, supra note 12, at 298-308.
153. Raoul Berger's arguments for strict intentionalism are less persuasive. See discussion
supra notes 91-110 and accompanying text.
154. Powell, supra note 12, at 894 (quoting Hewet v. Painter, 80 Eng. Rep. 864 (1611)).
155. Id. at 894-95 (footnotes omitted).
156. Id.
157. Professor Powell begins his study with jurist and parliamentarian, John Selden.
Although Selden insisted that the 'one true sense' of a document is that which 'the
Author meant when he [wrote] it' (the modem intentionalist's definition of 'intent'),
he also asserted that the court determines 'the intention of the King' solely on the
basis of the words of the law, and not by investigating any other source of informa-
tion about the lawgiver's purposes.
Id at 895 (quoting J. SELDEN, TABLE-TALK: BEING THE DiscouRsE OF JOHN SELDEN ESQ.
44 (London 1699)). Powell goes on to cite other common law treatises (eg., 1 J. POWELL,
ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS 244 (London 1790) ("the law
always regards the intention of the parties [by applying the parties' words] to that which, in
common presumption, may be taken to be their intent")). Finally, Professor Powell reviews
the judicial practice and concludes that this practice showed a lack of willingness to resort to
tools such as legislative history in determining the meaning of statutes. Powell, supra note 12,
at 897 n.60 (" 'And the Judges said they ought not to make any construction against the
express letter of the statute; for nothing can so express the meaning of the makers of the Act,
as their own direct words, for index animi sermo' ['the word is the sign or indicator of the
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concludes that "[t]he late eighteenth century common lawyer conceived
an instrument's 'intent'-and therefore its meaning-not as what the
drafters meant by their words but rather as what judges, employing the
'artificial reason and judgment of law,' understood 'the reasonable and
legal meaning' of those words to be."15 He also concludes that the
"[p]olitical and legal scholars in both Britain and the American colonies
viewed strict judicial adherence to the legislature's language as a consti-
tutional necessity, because the 'known, fixed laws' could be properly es-
tablished or altered only by 'the whole legislature,' which spoke only
through its enactments." 159
The shortcomings of Professor Powell's conclusions result partly
from a fallacious leap in logic. He concludes that because judges used
"artificial reason and judgment of law"" to determine meaning, legisla-
tive intent became irrelevant. This reasoning presupposes that this "rea-
son and judgment" was used to the exclusion of the legislative intent.161
This is not necessarily so. "Reason and judgment" could well have been
devices for determining meaning when the intent was not known.
Professor Powell admits the ambiguity of the word "intent" but
does not cite convincing evidence that his conclusion is more reasonable
than the conclusion that intent meant the legislative intent. Indeed, logic
soul']." (quoting Edrich's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 118a, 118b, 77 Eng. Rep. 238, 239 (C.P. 1603))).
Professor Powell has been criticized by assertions that he selectively used quotations and cita-
tions. See e.g., Berger, supra note 12, at 300 ("But [when] Powell [quoted from Edrich's Case,
he] overlooked Coke's immediately following sentence: 'And it would be dangerous to give
scope to make a construction in any case against the express words, when the meaning of the
makers doth not appear to the contrary." (emphasis provided in secondary source)). For a
gentler approach to such criticism, see Clinton, supra note 9, at 1186. For additional common
law citations which supported resort to the legislative intent in statutory construction, see
Berger, supra note 12, at 300-06.
158. Powell, supra note 12, at 895-96 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Prohibitions del Roy, 12
Co. Rep. 63, 65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (1608); Talbot qui tam v. Commanders and Owners
of three Brigs, 1 DalI. 95, 100 (Pa. 1784). Professor Powell contends that the text should be
interpreted to mean what it meant at the time of its writing. Id. at 948. However, since he
places so many handicaps upon modem-day interpreters in ascertaining this meaning, one
must conclude that this approach is nonoriginalistic in nature. Professor Powell's approach
seems to ignore "the important interpretive distinction between originalist textualism and ahis-
toric textual analysis .... ." Clinton, supra note 9, at 1194.
159. Powell, supra note 12, at 898 (quoting from L. LEDER, LIBERTY AND AuTHORrrY 86-
87 (1968)).
160. Id. at 896.
161. The fact that English jurists would not look to legislative history does not prove Pro-
fessor Powell's point. That practice merely stemmed from a belief that such evidence was,
under then-current methods of legislative history keeping, incompetent rather than from a
conclusion that legislative intent was irrelevant.
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dictates that the latter is the more plausible explanation. 162 The purpose
of judicial interpretation is application of the meaning of law to a dispute
in litigation. The parties to this "law" might be individuals agreeing to a
contract, legislators making statutes, or a society adopting a constitution.
But in each case, the words are merely the "media through which [the
parties'] meaning is conveyed." 163 Because the words do not have life of
their own force but live only through the parties, it would seem more
plausible that the ambiguity in the meaning of the word "intent" should
be resolved by favoring the intent of the parties over the "intent" of the
words.164
Finally, Professor Powell's thesis is not supported by the history
that immediately followed the Convention. 165 Many of the members of
the Convention and others active in the ratification process continued in
public service in the newly formed government. In this capacity, they
were often called upon to discuss publicly their understanding of the
meaning of the Constitution, often resorting to their recollection not just
of the text but of the intent of the parties at the Convention, at the state
ratification conventions, and in Congress. 
66
C. Moderate Intentionalism and the Constitution
1. Whose Intent Counts?
When commentators and courts speak of intentionalism, they often
refer to the intent of the prime movers in the drafting or ratification pro-
162. There is also evidence in the Constitutional Convention that the words themselves
were not to be the only source of interpretive evidence. When the Convention turned its atten-
tion to what later became Article III of the Constitution, a debate arose as to the need to limit
the judicial authority under that provision. James Madison asserted that it may have been
"going too far to extend the jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising Under the
Constitution, & whether it ought not to be limited to cases of a Judiciary Nature." 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (M. Farrand ed. 1966). However,
the debate ended, without changing the wording, when it was "generally supposed [by the
members of the Convention] that the jurisdiction given was constructively limited to cases of a
Judiciary nature." Id.
163. Attorney-General v. Malkin, 41 Eng. Rep. 866, 868 (Ch. 1845).
164. Professor Powell's arguments do no more than support the contention that it was the
citizenry's collective intent which is more significant than the intent of individuals or groups
involved in the process of drafting and ratifying the Constitution. See infra notes 167-90 and
accompanying text.
165. See Clinton, supra note 9, at 1197-1208.
166. Among these were Abraham Baldwin, Benjamin Bourne, Jonathan Dayton, Elbridge
Gerry, Charles Pinckney, Theodore Sedwick, Roger Sherman, William Smith, and even James
Madison. See id. at 1197-1200 and references cited therein. For reasons discussed in the next
subsection, the intent of these persons should not be considered as binding. However, the very
fact that their intent was offered in explanation contradicts Professor Powell's thesis.
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cess.' 67 This understandable tendency, however, should not obscure the
relevant inquiry into whose intent gave binding force to the
Constitution. 168
Many persons and groups can be considered as prime movers in the
drafting and ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.169
But despite the contributions of these prime movers, the Constitution is
not the product of any one of them' 70 or even their collective work. It is
a product and Constitution of all the citizenry.1 7 ' Therefore, the relevant
question is not, "What were the intentions of the prime movers?" '72
These persons and groups were only representing the citizenry at
large.173 The relevant inquiry examines the collective intent of the citi-
zenry. 174 They were the ones represented in the Constitutional Conven-
167. See S. BARBER, supra note 90, at 11; Rehnquist, supra note 27, at 693; Monaghan,
supra note 2, at 375 n.130; Monaghan, The Constitution at Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 117, 125-26 (1978); J. ELY, supra note 2, at 17-18; and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) at 407 (1819).
168. In an earlier Article, I am guilty of this tendency, which I now consider to be an error.
See Simien, supra note 109, at 539-42.
169. These groups included the drafters, the members of the Continental Congress that
sent the Constitution to the states for ratification, the members of Congress that voted on
amendments, and the ratifiers in the various ratification conventions or state legislatures.
170. The Constitution is a document that "emerged as a result of compromises struck after
hard bargaining." Monaghan, supra note 2, at 392.
171. See Berger, supra note 12. As stated in the preamble to the Constitution, it was "We
the People [who did] . . .ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America." See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 453-
547 (1969), for a discussion of how notions of popular sovereignty affected the Constitution.
172. The intentions, notions, and statements of the individuals during the process of draft-
ing and adopting the Constitution may be helpful in determining the underlying principles.
While turning to these tools, however, one must not lose sight of the fact that the intent of
these individuals or groups is only relevant to the extent that it sheds some light on the under-
lying principles incorporated into the Constitution when it became the Constitution for the
nation.
173. Many times in this capacity their individual views were not the ones they had vowed
to support. In some instances, the local delegates to the state conventions earned their election
by vowing to either support or oppose the Constitution. Others were formally instructed as to
how they should vote. Bittker, The Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent: The
Recent Past, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 235, 269 (1989).
174. This view of intentionalism negates many of the criticisms leveled against intentional-
ism in general. For example, four states did not ratify the Constitution until it was officially
operative (only nine states were needed). This raises the question of the significance of the
intent at the post-ratification conventions. See id. at 268. Under the approach advocated
here-particularly with its strong reliance upon the text of the Constitution, see infra notes
186-90 and accompanying text-the intent at the ratification conventions of specific pre- and
post-ratification states becomes less significant. The relevant inquiry is not state-specific. The
intent within the states is only evidence of the collective intent of all of "We the People." This
intent is also evidenced by many factors including the text of the Constitution.
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tions, the Continental Congress, the Congress, and the various state
ratification conventions and legislatures.
I make these statements fully aware that not only did much of the
citizenry not participate in the ratification process, but that they could
not participate due to qualification requirements. Furthermore, in many
instances, some of those eligible for participation may not have formed
any intent as to particular provisions or even underlying principles. Be-
cause no universally accepted interpretation existed for all of the consti-
tutional provisions or of the Constitution's underlying principles, there
was no true collective intent. 175
There was, however, at least nonspecific agreement on two impor-
tant points: (1) the incorporation and meaning of some of the underlying
principles that relate to individual rights, and (2) that other principles
not expressly enumerated in the Constitution were implicitly incorpo-
rated within the Constitution's protection of personal liberty. 176  This
sort of nonspecific agreement does not form a true collective intent about
a document which must be applied in specific cases. Thus, as the term
"collective intent" is used in this Article, it must be understood to mean
the understanding, as to underlying principles, the average person who
read and considered the import of the Constitution would have had. 177
This view of collective intent might also be called the original, objective
understanding of the document. 171
The major difference between the proposed approach to constitu-
tional interpretation and statutory interpretation as discussed above is
that the former relies upon the intent of the represented and the latter
upon the intent of the representatives. This difference in approach to
interpretation is justified by the different processes in the adoptions of
and functions served by statutes and constitutions. Within a representa-
tive system, statutes are enacted by representatives of the citizenry, act-
ing within their authority to bind the citizenry. This legislative authority
175. This would be so even if the relevant group were much smaller than the populace of
the United States in the period from 1787-1791. The larger the group, however, the more
pronounced the potential for lack of true collective intent.
176. See infra notes 191-272 and accompanying text.
177. This view of collective intent apparently was also what was meant by the founding
fathers when they spoke of the intent of the people. See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying
text.
178. This approach differs from Professor Powell's approach, which is discussed supra
notes 142-66 and accompanying text. Under Professor Powell's approach, the intent of the
text is to be derived only from the text itself. Under the proposed approach, however, resort to
any available means of ascertaining the original understanding of the document would be
appropriate.
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flows from and is granted by constitutions.
179
Constitutions, on the other hand, are the master rule of law. With-
out this master rule of law, there is no representative authority nor any
government. Therefore, assent to a constitution must be derived from
the whole of the people and it is their intent that becomes relevant, not
that of the representatives.'1 0 One may argue that in the adoption of our
Constitution the people's assent was given to the prime movers when the
representatives to the various conventions and legislatures were elected.
However, that would not comport with the original understanding.
For example, in referring to the Constitution, James Madison,
viewed by many as the father of the Constitution, stated that "it was the
duty of all to support it in its true meaning, as understood by the nation
at the time of its ratification."'8 1 In addition, the conclusion that the
citizenry as a whole formed the relevant body of intention for constitu-
tional interpretation was supported only seven years after the Constitu-
tion was ratified. When the Jay Treaty was negotiated in 1796, the
House of Representatives sought a resolution calling for the negotiation
papers used by the American representatives to the treaty. The call for
this resolution evoked a lengthy debate on the authority of the House to
concern itself with the process of treaty making." 2 During this debate,
members of the House argued that the interpretative intent manifested at
the Constitutional Convention and in the state ratification conventions
was that the Constitution should be interpreted as understood by the
general populace." 3 For example, William Smith, who had served as a
delegate to the South Carolina Ratification Convention, argued that in
interpreting the Constitution, one should refer to the period during the
drafting and ratification. From this basis he asserted that the Constitu-
tion should be interpreted in "the general sense of the whole nation at the
179. As used here, the term "constitutions" includes the documents, traditions, customs,
and rules of the various societies that establish a government and delineate its functions.
180. The Constitution establishes a republican form of government. See supra note 20 and
accompanying text. However, the Constitution should not necessarily be interpreted in light
of these republican theories. That form of government is an outgrowth and function of the
government formed. Because the Constitution is the master rule of law and predates this form
of government, republican theory does not necessarily dictate the appropriate model for consti-
tutional interpretation.
181. 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 245 (1865) (emphasis in orig-
inal). For other similar statements by James Madison, see infra note 192.
182. Article II, § 2 provides that the President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties .... "
183. See Clinton, supra note 9, at 1198-1208 and materials cited therein. The interpretative
intents of the persons in the House of Representatives at that time are not controlling on the
issue of appropriate constitutional interpretation. Such interpretive intent, however, is strong
evidence of the prevailing interpretive theory and objective understanding on this point.
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time the Constitution was formed .... 184
President Washington declined to comply with the House Resolu-
tion that was ultimately passed. In doing so, he sent a message to the
House, which relied not only upon his memory of the Constitutional
Convention but also upon the debates in the state ratification conven-
tions. James Madison responded to President Washington's message,
particularly his reliance upon his memory of the Constitutional Conven-
tion. Madison asserted that the Convention members' interpretive intent
was of little significance:
But, after all, whatever veneration might be entertained for the
body of men who formed our Constitution, the sense of that body
could never be regarded as the oracular guide in expounding the
Constitution. As the instrument came from them it was nothing
more than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life
and validity were breathed into it by the voice of the people, speak-
ing through the several State Conyentions.
1 85
2. Role of the Text
At this late date, to the extent that any true consensus existed, it
would be extremely difficult to recreate the consensus of understanding
184. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 495 (1796) (emphasis added). Benjamin Bourne also argued
(with citation to the North Carolina ratification debate) that in attempting to interpret Art. II,
§ 2, the House should heed and "obey the voice of the people." 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 574.
During this debate, Alexander Hamilton, just as he did when helping to write The Federalist,
took pen in hand and wrote under a pseudonym (this time Camillus). He asserted that true
constitutional interpretation would look to "the sense of the Community, in the adoption of
the Constitution[, which sense is evidenced and influenced by] the writings for and against the
Constitution and the debates in the several state Conventions." 20 THE PAPERS OF ALEXAN-
DER HAMILTON 23-24 (H. Syrett ed. 1974); see also 2 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 17,
at 467 (relying upon the "intention of the people" for guide as to the meaning and interpreta-
tion of the Constitution). Some opponents to the treaty placed less reliance upon these
sources of interpretive intent. For example, Edward Livingston, who introduced the resolu-
tion, contended that the Constitution should be interpreted by resort to its wording. 5 AN-
NALS OF CONG. 635 (1796).
185. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 776 (1796). Similar comments were made by James Madison in
other contexts. In 1821, Madison wrote that the meaning of the Constitution must be sought
in its text, but if it "is to be sought elsewhere, it must be not in the opinions or intentions of the
Body which planned & proposed the Constitution, but in the sense attached to it by the people
in their respective State Conventions where it reed. [sic] all the authority which it possesses."
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 447-48 (M. Farrand ed. 1966)
(Letter to Thomas Ritchie (September 15, 1821)). That same year, Madison wrote to J.G.
Jackson, asserting that the Constitution should be supported "in its true meaning as under-
stood by the Nation at the time of its ratification." Id. at 450 (Letter to J.G. Jackson (Decem-
ber 27, 1821)) (emphasis in original). Some nine years later, Madison was still claiming that
the Constitution should be interpreted by reference to the manner in which it was "understood
by the [ratifying] Conventions, or rather by the people who thro' [sic] their Conventions, ac-
cepted & ratified it." Id at 489 (Letter to Andrew Stevenson (November 17, 1830)) (emphasis
added).
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that led to the ratification of the Constitution. Therefore, in attempting
to recreate the collective intent, reliance must be placed on the text of the
Constitution itself. This is particularly true when the text is sufficiently
clear to provide substantial guidance as to its meaning and its underlying
principles. When courts try to determine the intent of a group (e.g., the
legislature that passed a statute), the text is the only thing upon which
there was expressed collective agreement. Thus, the text itself is often
the best indicator of that group's objective understanding. 86 The logic
of this conclusion is multiplied where the relevant intent is not that of a
small group but the objective understanding of the American populace
between 1787 and 1791.
Consequently, as a general rule, the text will be the best indicator of
the original, objective understanding of the Constitution. Therefore, in
determining the underlying principles of the Constitution, there should
be a strong presumption that the text's meaning is controlling over the
individual statements or even the statements of any one group. 187 Only
when clear evidence exists of an objective understanding contrary to that
expressed in the text should that interpretation be preferred to the
text.1
88
Despite strong reliance upon the text of the Constitution, the term
intentionalism is preferred to textualism.18 9 Proof of the original, objec-
186. "Lord Chancellor Hatton, writing in 1677, [concluded that]... 'when the intent is
proved, that must be followed; ... but whensoever there is departure from the words to the
intent, that must be well proved that there is such meaning." Berger, supra note 12, at 302
(quoting C. HATTON, A TREATISE CONCERNING STATUTES, OR ACTS OF PARLIAMENT: AND
THE ExPOSITION THEREOF 14-15 (London 1677) (emphasis added).
187. As stated in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202-03 (1819) (empha-
sis added):
fA]lthough the spirit of an instrument, especially of a constitution, is to be respected
not less than its letter, yet the spirit is to be collected chiefly [though not exclusively]
from its words.... But if, in any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not contra-
dicted by any other provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded, because
we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it must be
one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case, would
be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the
application.
188. [E]vidence ought to be very strong to justify a construction inconsistent with the
ordinary meaning of the words used. That such cases may exist cannot be doubted,
for the words being only the media through which the meaning is conveyed, it is
immaterial what words are used if we are sufficiently informed what meaning they
are intended to bear ....
Attorney-General v. Malkin, 41 Eng. Rep. 866-68 (Ch. 1845).
189. Some might view this model of interpretation as a hybrid between intentionalism and
textualism. Such a view, however, is not well-founded. While there is a strong reliance upon
the text, the ultimate aim of the model is the enforcement of the objective understanding of the
Constitution.
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tive understanding (intent) would always trump the provision's language.
If there is sufficient evidence that the average person would have under-
stood the text to have a meaning contrary to what appears to be the clear
import of the words, this understanding would prevail.190 In addition,
several provisions of the Constitution are not sufficiently precise to pro-
vide adequate guidance as to their meaning or underlying principles.
Most provisions relating to individual rights fall into this category. In
these circumstances, resort to other considerations is not only desirable
but necessary. For all provisions, reliance upon their historical develop-
ment and the then-prevailing notions of political and legal philosophy is
very important. For the less clear provisions, however, it is even more
important because there is no text which provides significant insight into
their meaning.
III. Natural Law and Original Intent1 91
Moderate originalism requires modem-day judges to consider not
only the original application of the Constitution, but also its underlying
principles. These principles are best understood by studying the political
philosophy of the people who adopted the Constitution. In this section, I
will demonstrate that natural law theories were a substantial component
of the prevailing political philosophy of the people of 1787-1791.
Through this demonstration I hope to show that natural law theories are
not only consistent with originalist adjudication but are a necessary com-
ponent of it.
190. The only purpose of reliance upon the language is as evidence of the objective under-
standing. If the language is clear, it will be difficult to overcome the presumption of what was
intended by the provision's approval.
191. See supra note 13 for an explanation of how the term "natural law" is used in this
Article.
My purpose in writing this section is not to engage in a detailed exposition of natural law
theories. Such detail is contained in many of the cited works. Some of these works include:
H. BRAGDON & J. PITTENGER, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1969); A. KELLY & W. HARBISON,
supra note 13; C. MULLETT, FUNDAMENTAL LAW AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1760-
1776 (1933); A. NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS (1947); B.
PATTERSON, supra note 57; R. POUND, supra note 13; R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL
OF RIGHTS 1776-1791 (1955); P. SIGMUND, NATURAL LAW IN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1971);
R. STOREY, OUR UNALIENABLE RIGHTS (1965); Kelly, Where Constitutional Liberties Come
From, in FOUNDATIONS OF FREEDOM (A. Kelly ed. 1958); Palmer, supra note 114; and
Rowsome, How Blackstone Lost the Colonies: English Law, Colonial Lawyers, and the
American Revolution (1972) (unpublished dissertation). My purpose is merely to demonstrate
that these theories cannot be ignored in an originalistic approach to constitutional
interpretation.
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A. European Natural Law Influences and Colonial Thought
The concept of natural and inherent rights was not a creation of the
Bill of Rights,1 92 the American Constitution, 193 or even the colonial
American cry for independence.' 94 Prior to the colonization of America,
it long had been thought that certain rights were not created by govern-
ments or constitutions. Therefore, when the colonists decried British
policies by asserting that laws, constitutions, and even bills of rights did
not create all rights, they rested upon principles of much antiquity.'95 By
192. At no point does the Bill of Rights purport to create rights. All of the provisions
appear to proceed upon the assumption that the enumerated rights already existed, and that
the Bill of Rights is merely a recognition of this fact. As stated in the debates on the adoption
of the Bill of Rights, "The amendments reported are a declaration of rights; the people are
secure in them, whether we declare them or not.. . ." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 742 (J. Gales ed.
1789) (statements of Representative Roger Sherman on Aug. 13, 1789). In introducing the
draft of the Bill of Rights to Congress, James Madison expressed concern that a bill of rights
might be construed as an indication that the people had retained only those rights in the decla-
ration. He clearly indicated, however, that this was not the result of the bill of rights that he
drafted and introduced. He guarded against this perception by the inclusion of what later
became the Ninth Amendment. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 455-57 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
193. Prior to the inclusion of the Bill of Rights, the Preamble provided that "We the Peo-
ple of the United States, in order to ... secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." At the
time that the Preamble was written, there was no intent to include a Bill of Rights in the
Constitution. Both history and logic support the conclusion that the Preamble's reference to
these blessings of liberty was a reference to the rights that formed the basis for the eloquently
stated complaints in the Declaration of Independence some eleven years earlier.
The Constitution should be construed in light of its Preamble. See Hamilton, Opinion on
the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (1791), reprinted in 8 PAPERS OF ALEXAN-
DER HAMILTON 105 (H. Syrett ed. 1965); see also Powell, supra note 12, at 899 (citing British
authority for the proposition that a statute's preamble was indicative of the intent of the stat-
ute). Accordingly, the Constitution's statement in the Preamble is of interpretive value.
194. "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men . .. are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of
Happiness." The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
Without the recognition of the existence of these unalienable rights, the Declaration of
Independence would have lacked legitimate support:
[I]t is only by recognizing that rights exist prior to and independent of governments
that they can serve effectively to measure or evaluate governments. Hence, it was the
rights of man and not of Englishmen that the Declaration [of Independence] relied
on when making the case against the king and for independence; after all, the king
(or king-in-parliament) had the authority to define the rights of Englishmen and
could be expected to know better than Jefferson, Adams, and Franklin what they
were.
W. BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY 28 (1987).
195. Today, our political discourse relies on beliefs of human rights independent of any
governmental recognition of those rights. In a 1984 State Department report, the Iranian
government was criticized for its treatment of religious minorities. COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1984 (Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, U.S. Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, by
the Department of State 1235 (February 1985)). "But Iran can be blamed for this only if
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the time these protests were heard in the colonies, the prevailing political
thought was that natural law theories contributed to the definition of the
relationship of men in society and that the "law of the time and place was
only declaratory."'1 96
Colonial political theory was derived primarily from seventeenth
and eighteenth century writers on natural law and the English legal-
ists.197 Natural law theories based upon the notion that certain princi-
ples are inherent in the very nature of the universe and of mankind,
however, are much older. 98 Examples of natural law theory date back
to Plato's Republic, in which he advocated a concept of absolute justice
that did not depend on human enactment.1 99 These ancient natural law
freedom of conscience is truly a human right, belonging to man as man, and not merely an
American or peculiarly Western idea of a human right .... " W. BERNS, supra note 194, at 29.
However, natural law theories are not without their critics:
[AIll the many attempts to build a moral and political doctrine upon the conception
of a universal human nature have failed. Either the allegedly universal ends are too
few and abstract to give content to the idea of the good, or they are too numerous
and concrete to be truly universal.
R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLTIcs 241 (1975); see also J. ELY, supra note 2, at 54
("[O]ur society does not, rightly does not, accept the notion of a discoverable and objectively
valid set of moral principles .... "). Of course for the true originalists, the validity of natural
law theories is irrelevant. All that is relevant is the original understanding of and belief in such
theories. See supra note 13.
196. Pound, Introduction to B. PATERSON, supra note 57, at iii. A unified attempt to
define the details of natural law did not exist. Instead, our Founding Fathers were content
simply to provide that man had immutable and unalienable rights and privileges that were
derived from the "nature of things," allowing the details of the contours of these rights to be
later discovered. C. LEBOUTILLIER, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND NATURAL LAW 109
(1950).
197. Although many legal philosophers were widely read and their ideas found prominent
place in revolutionary propaganda, only the more educated colonists were well versed in the
writers prior to the seventeenth century. In addition, few European legal philosophers had the
impact of Locke or Sidney. C. MULLETr, supra note 191, at 78. But see Murrin, supra note
95, at 41 (concluding that Locke did not have as significant an impact on colonial thinking as
some might ascribe). However, much of the pre-seventeenth century writings influenced the
later writers, who in turn significantly influenced early Americans. Therefore, a brief review of
earlier thought is appropriate.
198. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 13, at 36.
199. The question posed by the Greeks was "What . . . is behind positive law? From
Heraelitus to the Stoics the answer returned was 'God' or 'Nature', and natural law was the
permanent and universal law." C. MULLE-rT, supra note 191, at 14. The Greek views on
natural law were transmitted to the Romans through Cicero. In Rome, "the abstract nature
concepts of the Greeks [were transmuted] into natural law." Id. at 15. While the Greeks
sought to show the connection between positive laws and the immutable background of natural
justice, the Romans regarded natural law as the source of positive law. This positive law could
be no more than declaratory of the natural order. Id. at 15-16. The Roman versions of natural
law did not come directly to colonial America. The version that crossed the Atlantic included
sources foreign to the ancient Romans (eg., the Bible). The Roman natural law theories,
however, did influence American political thought. Id at 16-18.
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theories were carried over into the medieval period.2°°
The rise of what is considered as the modem era of natural law theo-
ries came about in the late sixteenth century. The society in which these
political theorists lived was one in which the State was freed from ecclesi-
astical control, decentralized by feudalism, and theoretically allied to the
Holy Roman Empire. The natural law theories were relied upon to an-
swer the problems created by the rulers' (usually monarchs) refusal to
acknowledge superior controls by any political or religious body. Natu-
ral law theories were viewed as a potential source of restraint on the
power of the monarch.2 °
In the seventeenth century, many who sought to restrain the powers
of the monarch relied upon a union of natural law theories with the so-
cial compact doctrine.2 "2 Johannas Althusis (d. 1683) was perhaps the
first to join modernized natural laws theories with the Calvinist compact
doctrine.20 3 Thereafter, John Locke, °M John Milton,20 5 James Harring-
ton, and Algernon Sydney20 6 (all of whom were English), and Samuel
Pufendorf,207 Emmerich Vattel,20° and Jean Jacques Burlamaqui20 9 (all
200. Id. at 35.
201. Id. at 36.
202. Id. at 35. The tendency to rely upon natural law theories as a source for limiting the
powers of the monarch was reinforced by developments in the sciences, particularly astronomy
and physics. These scientific developments seemed to demonstrate that all nature operated by
immutable and eternal laws inherent in the nature of the universe itself. Id.
203. Id. at 37.
204. John Locke, who had a very significant influence on colonial political thought, and
John Milton both felt there were unalienable rights and privileges that were possessed by every
individual in the state of nature. These rights and privileges were reserved even in organized
society. The limited government notions inherent in the Declaration of Independence have
their roots in natural law theories. Kelly, supra note 191, at 13-18.
205. John Milton, who wrote Areopagitica in 1644, argued that, by the laws of God and
nature, man has a right to defend himself against unjust laws. For a more in-depth discussion
of the works of John Milton, see C. MULLETT, supra note 191, at 53-54.
206. Among the writers of the later seventeenth century, none was given more considera-
tion by the colonists than Algernon Sydney. C. MULLETr, supra note 191, at 56. Sydney
taught that if laws (and even constitutions) were contrary to the laws of God and nature, they
were not just and should not be obeyed. WORKS OF ALGERNON SYDNEY 328 (1772).
207. Pufendorf's Of the Law of Nature and Nations (Kennett trans. 1710) contributed
heavily to colonial American political philosophy. Among his followers were James Otis and
James Wilson. C. MULLETr, supra note 191, at 27. Pufendorf's work shows a heavy influence
by Hugo Grotius. Id. Otis, Wilson, and others were also influenced by Burlamaqui and Vat-
tel. Id. at 30.
208. At least by 1775, Benjamin Franklin received a copy of Vattel's The Law of Nations or
the Principles of the Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns,
which was the most often cited work in support of the colonial rights. P. SIGMUND, supra note
191, at 99; A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 191, at 161. Vattel differed from other continental writ-
ers (with the exception of Montesquieu, who also appealed to the early Americans) because he
emphasized fundamental law as separate and independent of natural law. C. MULLETT, supra
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from the continent) used and developed the same body of ideas.2"' By
the eighteenth century, natural law theory was universally accepted in
the colonies in one form or another.2 1
In addition to the natural law theorists, English legal philosophers
and jurists also influenced early American political thought. The earliest
English legal philosophers studied by colonial Americans were probably
Glanvill and Bracton. Although Glanvill did not contribute to the devel-
opment of the American use of fundamental law, Bracton believed in and
wrote heavily on natural law.212
Sir Edward Coke, author of Institutes and Commentaries on the
Common Law, greatly influenced the colonial ideas on limited govern-
ment.213 Coke contended that the Magna Carta and the common law
embodied fundamental principles of right and justice. He argued from
this conclusion that the Magna Carta and the common law were there-
fore supreme and could bind the acts of Parliament and the king.2" 4 To
many colonists, Coke was the highest legal authority, and to Coke, posi-
tive law was subject to the law of nature.21 5
note 191, at 28-31. The most basic difference between natural law and fundamental law is
perhaps that the former is immutable while the latter could be changed by the whole of the
people. P. SIGMUND, supra note 191, at 99. This distinction might help explain the amending
process built into the Constitution.
209. When Thomas Jefferson substituted Locke's trilogy (life, liberty, and property) with
the one used in the Declaration of Independence, he may have done so because of the influence
of Burlamaqui, who had already so modified Locke's teachings. Murrin, supra note 95, at 45.
210. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 13, at 37.
211. As Roscoe Pound points out:
In the philosophical jurisprudence of the eighteenth century the idea of natural law
was universally accepted. Out of this theory of universal ideal law grew a theory of
natural, that is, ideal, rights, demonstrated by reason as deductions from human na-
ture-from the ideal abstract man.... [J]urists on the Continent held to four pro-
positions: (1.) There are natural rights demonstrable by reason. They are eternal
and absolute. They are valid for all men in all times and all places. (2.) Natural law
is a body of rules, ascertainable by reason, which perfectly secures all these natural
rights. (3.) The state exists only to secure men in these natural rights. (4.) Positive
law, the law applied and enforced by the courts, is the means by which the state
performs this function and is morally binding only so far as it conforms to natural
law.
R. POUND, supra note 13, at 74. Of course, there was disagreement as to what these natural
law theories required.
212. C. MULLETr, supra note 191, at 33-34; P. SIGMUND, supra note 191, at 98-111.
213. R. POUND, supra note 13, at 57; A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 13, at 44;
Goebel, Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 555, 563 (1938)
("[I]t is upon the methods and constitutional views of Coke that the colonial lawyers were
nurtured.").
214. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 13, at 46.
215. C. MULLETr, supra note 191, at 44-46. The most famous application of Coke's views
on the superiority of the common law (as declaratory of the natural law) is Dr. Bonham's
Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (1610), and on the superiority of natural law is Calvin's Case, 7 Co.
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Blackstone, the other great English jurist of that era, was also
widely read in the colonies and provided additional impetus to the revo-
lutionary fervor.2 16 Blackstone taught that "[h]uman laws contrary to
natural law had no validity and that valid positive laws derived 'all their
force and their authority, mediately or immediately, from this
original.' 55217
Although Coke and Blackstone were the most influential British ju-
rists, other jurists also contributed to America's natural law tendencies.
Chief Justice Hobait, whose work also was f'avored in the colonies,
agreed with Coke and Blackstone that law in violation of natural law was
a nullity. In Day v. Savadge,2 18 Chief Justice Hobart held that a law
which allowed a man to be a judge in his own case was contrary to natu-
ral law. He therefore concluded that this "[a]ct of Parliament, made
against natural equity ... is void in it self." '219
B. Natural Law and the Call for Independence 220
Throughout the period leading up to the American Revolution, the
colonists invariably relied upon natural law theories as a bulwark against
absolute parliamentary power.221 Because all law was thought to have its
base in natural law, it is not difficult to see why the dominant cry during
the American revolutionary period was that any law that was inconsis-
Rep. la, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (1608). See C. MULLETT, supra note 191, at 45; Rowsome, supra
note 191, at 7-8.
216. C. MULLETr, supra note 191, at 65; R. POUND, supra note 13, at 60-63.
217. C. MULLETT, supra note 191, at 65 (quoting COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENG-
LAND, Vol. i, 29, 31 (Lewis ed. 1897)). Not all agree that Blackstone should be cited for a
strong stance on natural law. Some feel that some of the statements in Commentaries about
natural law are merely "exotic phrases" and do not comport with the overall tenor of the
work. See, e.g., C. MULLETr, supra note 191, at 65 n.89.
218. 80 Eng. Rep. 235 (1614).
219. Id. at 237. Edward Bulstode, Chief Justice of North Wales, was occasionally cited in
colonial American propaganda pamphlets. He wrote that positive law depended upon the
"law of God and the law of nature." C. MULLErT, supra note 191, at 49-50.
220. For a detailed discussion of the contributions that natural law made to the molding of
revolutionary attitudes and propaganda, see C. MULLETT, supra note 191. As has been
observed, "[t]he Declaration of Independence only said, though somewhat more effectively,
what hundreds of known and unknown writers had been arguing briefly or verbosely since the
days of James Otis's Vindication of the House of Representatives." Id. at 123.
Because natural law tended to justify a break from England or disobedience of English
laws, one might argue that this reliance was more opportunistic than an indication of a true
philosophical bent. However, history demonstrates that this reliance reflected the attitude
with which the new nation was formed and the Constitution was drafted, ratified, and
amended by the Bill of Rights. See Murrin, supra note 95, at 40.
221. C. MULLETT, supra note 191, at 79-80.
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tent with natural law was void.
2 22
When the initial disputes arose between the American colonists and
England over the denial of what were perceived as fundamental and nat-
ural rights, the Americans did not desire independence. Accordingly,
the call was for changes in English policies so that they would be consis-
tent with the rights of Englishmen as well as natural law theories.223
Even after fighting broke out, the Continental Congress resolved in July
of 1775 that independnce was not its desire. It condemned England's
handling of the American colonies, however, and relied, in part, upon the
"immutable laws of nature" in asserting the rights belonging to the
colonists.224
In his arguments in the Writs of Assistance Case of 1761,225 James
Otis argued that "[a]n act against the constitution is void... ."226 James
Otis's contributions to importing natural law influences did not end after
his arguments in the Writs of Assistance Case. In writing The Vindication
of the House of Representatives in 1762, James Otis premised his argu-
222. Some early Americans realized that their reliance upon natural law theories in their
struggle with England was inconsistent with slavery, which prevailed in America at that time.
In fact, in the first draft of the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson, a slave owner, included
a condemnation of slavery as a violation of the natural right of human liberty. P. SIGMUND,
supra note 191, at 104. James Madison in The Federalist No. 42 decried slavery as an "unnatu-
ral traffic." 1 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 17, at 287 (emphasis added). James Otis also
condemned slavery as "a shocking violation of the law of nature" because "colonists are by the
law of nature freeborn, as indeed all men are, white or black." Otis, The Rights of the British
Colonies Asserted and Proved, in PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 439 (B. Bailyn
ed. 1965).
223. H. BRAGDON & J. PITTENGER, supra note 191, at 14-15. For example, in the Conti-
nental Congress' Declaration of Rights, reliance was placed upon the common law rights of
Englishmen. R. POUND, supra note 13, at 75. But the rights flowing from the nature of the
universe and man's relationship to it and the rights of Englishmen were considered the same.
Therefore, the transition to reliance solely upon natural law theories was not difficult when the
call was for independence. Id.
224. See, R. RUTLAND, supra note 191, at 26 (quoting Extracts from the Proceedings of the
Continental Congress 3 (Philadelphia, 1774)).
225. This argument has been described, along with Patrick Henry's "Liberty or Death"
speech, as "one of the most memorable moments of the years leading up to the Revolution"
and to have "sounded a constitutional note which was to make its influence felt in the years
that followed." D. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CON-
STITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 133-36 (1968).
226. Quoted in J. AGRESTO, supra note 121, at 40. Otis was not referring to a written
constitution because England had none at the time. In A Vindication of the British Colonies,
Otis explained that he spoke of a constitution based on natural law theories. C. MULLETr,
supra note 191, at 84.
John Adams echoed similar sentiments when he declared that "[y]ou have rights antece-
dent to all earthly governments; rights that cannot be repealed or restrained by human laws;
rights derived from the Great Legislator of the Universe." Quoted in B. PATTERSON, supra
note 57, at 20. In 1765, he also argued that the Stamp Act was void as it violated the rights
granted to the colonists by natural law. R. POUND, supra note 13, at 64.
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ments upon the writings of John Locke.227 After the passage of revenue
acts in 1764 and 1765, Otis wrote The Rights of the British Colonies As-
serted and Proved. In this piece, Otis engaged in a systematic attempt to
discover "the natural, political, and civil rights of colonists." '228 Otis ar-
gued that "[t]he Parliament cannot make 2 and 2, 5: omnipotency can-
not do it .... Should an act of Parliament be against any of [God's]
natural laws, . . . their declaration would be contrary to eternal truth,
equity and justice, and consequently void." '229
Samuel Adams joined the criticism of English policy in his series of
letters to English officials wherein he argued that the English constitu-
tion "had its foundation in the law of God and nature and was the source
of legislative power."23 In arguing that the laws of nature acted as a
supplementation to the English constitution, Adams referred to several
sources including Locke, Blackstone, and history. One example he listed
was the Magna Carta, which he found "derived its foundation in
nature.
231
The Declaration of Independence was drafted by a committee that
included Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger
Sherman, and Robert Livingston. Thomas Jefferson was given the task
of preparing the first draft.232 In preparing the draft, Jefferson relied
very heavily upon John Locke's writings justifying the expulsion of
James II in the Glorious Revolution.233 Jefferson's reliance on John
Locke's theories is particularly evident in the opening paragraph of the
Declaration of Independence. This paragraph is a slightly modified re-
statement of the primary thesis of Locke's Second Treatise of
Government.
234
It is not clear when the term "unalienable rights" was included in
the Declaration of Independence. It may have been included as a change
by John Adams at the time of the document's printing.235 There is little
227. C. MULLETT, supra note 191, at 82.
228. Id. at 83. James Otis relied upon Coke's opinions in Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. la, 77
Eng. Rep. 377 (1608) and Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610) and otherwise gener-
ally relied upon natural law theories. R. POUND, supra note 13, at 73.
229. Otis, supra note 222, at 454 (emphasis in original).
230. C. MULLETT, supra note 191, at 95.
231. Id. at 97.
232. R. STOREY, supra note 191, at 3.
233. H. BRAGDON & J. PrrITENGER, supra note 191, at 15.
234. P. SIGMUND, supra note 191, at 98. The Declaration of Independence also makes
indirect references to, among other English Documents, the Magna Carta, the Confirmation of
Edward I of the same, the English Bill of Rights, and the Articles of Barons. R. POUND, supra
note 13, at 75-76.
235. R. STOREY, supra note 191, at 3.
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dispute, however, that the unalienable rights referred to in the Declara-
tion of Independence were derived from natural law theories as rights
"inherent in man as a human being, 'endowed by the Creator.' "236
C. Natural Law and the Drafting of the Constitution
The subsequent history of the new nation proved that its reliance
upon natural law theories was not merely a battle cry in its struggle
against Britain.2 3 7 The natural law theory not only influenced colonial
legal philosophy, but it also played a significant part in sparking the
American Revolution and the call for a written constitution and a bill of
rights.23 In keeping with this philosophy, the Delaware delegates to the
Constitutional Convention took an oath to "exert their abilities on behalf
of the 'natural, civil and religious Rights and Privileges' of the citi-
zenry." '23 9 This oath was indicative of the attitude with which the draft-
ers approached the Convention. As stated in the Constitution's
Preamble, one of the primary functions of a constitutional government is
"to 'secure the blessings of liberty' or, they could just as well have said,
to secure the rights with which all men are by nature endowed." 2"
In light of these influences and attitudes, how could the delegates to
the Constitutional Convention of 1787 omit a bill of rights? Most consti-
tutional scholars agree that there were two primary reasons. First, the
prevailing view was that the rights derived from natural law were not
subject to infringement whether they were incorporated into a document
or not. Even without a bill of rights, the drafters felt secure in these
236. Id. at 4 (quoting from the Declaration of Independence).
237. James Wilson found support for the Constitution in his belief that it was based upon
the same foundation as the Declaration of Independence. Kaminski, Restoring the Declaration
of Independence, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
LIVELY HERITAGE 141 (J. Kukla ed. 1987). Even long after independence was won and the
government secure, Thomas Jefferson suggested that John Locke's Second Treatise of Govern-
ment be "required reading at the University of Virginia Law School." W. BERNS, supra note
194, at 248.
238. As Alfred Kelly observes:
The fundamental principle of constitutional liberty is the doctrine of limited govern-
ment, by which we mean that the major processes for the exercise of political power
in the state are checked, controlled and limited by form of law .... [Tihere are only
certain types of power that the government may exercise... [and those] correct
forms of power may be exercised only according to certain prescribed processes.
Very closely associated with the foregoing is another idea: that all individuals in the
society enjoy certain rights and immunities against the state, of which they may not
be lawfully deprived.
Kelly, supra note 191, at 7; see id. at 10.
239. R. RUTLAND, supra note 191, at 55 (quoting PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF
THE DELAWARE STATE 10 (Wilmington, 1927)).
240. Berns, supra note 13, at 51.
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rights and in their belief that they formed a part of the new nation's
constitutional law.24 I The second reason, and the one most discussed at
the Convention, was that a government of designated powers could not
infringe rights except as expressly provided for in the Constitution.242
The very lack of a bill of rights in the Constitution as originally
drafted evidences the fact that the early Americans believed in the exist-
ence of rights other than those enumerated in the Constitution.243 As C.
Edward Merriam points out, for early Americans, "the great lesson of
history was, that government always tends to become oppressive, and
that it is the greatest foe of individual liberty." 2" In light of this great
lesson, surely the nation's founders would not have instituted a new na-
241. Oliver Ellsworth objected when a motion was made to include a protection against ex
post facto laws. The motion was ultimately passed. Ellsworth "contended that there was no
lawyer, no civilian who would not say that ex post facto laws were void of themselves." 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 376 (M. Farrand ed. 1966). In later
writings, Alexander Hamilton noted that "[c]ivil liberty is only natural liberty, modified and
secured by the sanctions of civil society." 1 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (H.C.
Lodge ed. 1904).
242. R. POUND, supra note 13, at 65. Hindsight tells us that this was not a good argument.
There was substantial potential for expansion of federal governmental authority in the Neces-
sary and Proper and Commerce Clauses. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. James Madison did not take
the position that the federal government had only limited power to impinge upon rights. R.
RUTLAND, supra note 191, at 192. In a letter to Thomas Jefferson he wrote, "My own opinion
has always been in favor of a bill of rights; provided it be so framed as not to imply powers not
meant to be included in the enumeration." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson
(Oct. 17, 1788), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (R. Rutland & C. Hobson ed. 1977).
He did, however, think that a bill of rights "might contain the seeds of harm" because "some
of the most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude." Idr Others also
feared that a listing within a bill of rights might be construed as exhaustive. James Wilson
argued before the Pennsylvania ratifying convention in opposition to a bill of rights in the
following terms:
But in a government consisting of enumerated powers, such as is proposed for the
United States, a bill of rights would not only be unnecessary, but, in my humble
judgment, highly imprudent.... If we attempt an enumeration, everything that is
not enumerated is presumed to be given. The consequence is, that an imperfect
enumeration would throw all implied power into the scale of the government, and
the rights of the people would be rendered incomplete.
2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 436 (J. Elliot ed. 1836).
243. See Berns, supra note 13, at 59-62. Berns argues that the entire Constitution was
created to protect individual liberty through division of power and a system of checks and
balances. See also Clinton, supra note 9, at 1222-23, concluding that natural law and natural
rights theorists
had a profound impact on the shaping of both our Constitution and the interpretive
approaches taken to the document. The Constitution was not a set of popularly
ordained principles that had force merely because of their authoritative declaration.
... Rather, it was a carefully crafted document in which [the people's] representa-
tives sought to design a government reflecting their understanding of natural rights
principles.
244. C. MERRIAM, AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES 77 (1903).
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tion designed "to form a more perfect Union, ... and secure the Blessings
of Liberty"245 without providing constitutional protections for basic
liberties.
The inclusion of a bill of fights, however, was not thought necessary
for this purpose. When the Constitution was adopted, it was almost uni-
versally believed that individual freedom and personal liberty were pos-
sessed by all men and that it was not necessary to include their protection
in the Constitution.2 46 As the Declaration of Independence states, these
truths were "self-evident" and did not require exposition.247 It is impos-
sible to read the debates at the Constitutional Convention "without com-
ing to the certain conclusion that a Bill of Rights was not included [in the
Constitution as originally drafted and ratified] because these fights were
so inherent and fundamental that they need[ed] no constitutional
recognition."248
D. Natural Law and the Ratification Process
Despite explanations, the omission of a bill of rights became a focal
point in the ratification process.2 49 Many thought it was a tragic over-
sight not to include protections for natural and other rights in the Consti-
tution. Had it not been for Federalist concessions and promises to
immediately seek a bill of rights to set forth these protections, key states
would have been lost and the new nation doomed.25 °
The Federalists contended that no bill of rights was necessary while
the Anti-Federalists argued that the Constitution be rejected because it
lacked a bill of rights. Notably, both groups relied upon natural law
theories for their arguments.
In arguing for the ratification of the Constitution despite the absence
of a bill of rights, the Federalists asserted that there was no need to pro-
245. U.S. CONST. preamble (emphasis added).
246. Even many of those provisions in the original documents which might ostensively be
considered to confer rights (Article I, §§ 9, 10, Article III, and Article IV), can be explained as
being more concerned with the functioning of the system than with individual liberties.
Palmer, supra note 114, at 88-102.
247. B. PATTERSON, supra note 57, at 7.
248. Id. At the Virginia ratification convention, the Anti-Federalists argued that the pro-
posed constitution was flawed without a bill of rights. Relying upon the independent existence
of rights under natural law theories, Governor Edmond Randolph attempted to diffuse this
argument by asserting that a bill of rights was useless and unnecessary. 3 DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, at 68-
71 (J. Elliot ed. 1836). And, as the Ninth Amendment (and its indirect reference to the Decla-
ration of Independence) makes clear, there are rights not enumerated in the Bill of Rights
which exist and are self-evident.
249. Kaminski, supra note 237, at 145.
250. Id. at 147.
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vide for fights that were inherent in the nature of mankind and its rela-
tionship to the universe. One Federalist stated that "in exercising those
[necessary and proper] powers, the Congress cannot legally violate the
natural fights of an individual." '251 Another Federalist argued that "no
power was given to Congress to infringe on any one of the natural fights
of the people by this Constitution; and, should they attempt it without
constitutional authority, the act would be a nullity, and could not be
enforced." '252 James Wilson defended the omission of a bill of fights by
arguing that "it would have been superfluous and absurd to have stipu-
lated with a federal body of our own creation, that we should enjoy those
privileges of which we are not divested, either by the intention or the act
that has brought the body into existence."253 In The Federalist No. 84,
Hamilton asserts that the inclusion of a Bill of Rights would be "unnec-
essary." Hamilton also said that the Constitution is itself a bill of fights.
He argued that the Preamble was "a better recognition of popular fights,
than volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal figure in sev-
eral of our State bills of fights ....,254
The Anti-Federalists used natural law theories to oppose ratifica-
tion. John F. Mercer, author of The Anti-Federalist No. 60, argued that
the plan be rejected because it did not include a bill of fights. He as-
serted that reason and history showed the defects in the new documents.
He also argued that, under the British system, the colonists had been
secured by the fundamental laws, which failed to protect them. From
this he concluded that a bill of fights was necessary to secure "the natu-
ral and unalienable rights of men in a constitutional manner."25 In a
letter to Richard Henry Lee, Samuel Adams supported his opposition to
the ratification of the Constitution by claiming that it was a danger to
251. Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in How DOES THE CONSTITUTION
SECURE RIcGHTS? 15, 25 (R. Goldwin & W. Schambra ed. 1985) (quoting Essays by "Aristi-
des," Md. J. & Baltimore Advertiser, Mar. 4, 1788).
252. 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION 162 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) (quoting Theophilus Parsons in the Massachu-
setts ratifying convention).
253. Address by James Wilson at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Oct. 6,
1787), quoted in R. KETCHAM, ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTION DEBATES 184 (1986).
254. 2 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 17, at 155. The Federalist contains other examples of
the resort to natural law theories and the common understanding that the Constitution was
not the exclusive source of civil protections. For example, in The Federalist No. 83, Hamilton
argues that there should have been significant concern over the lack of protection for the right
to jury trial in a civil case. He asserts that because the right to trial by jury was well-grounded
in the common law, the right should continue to be recognized. Id. at 503.
255. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 176 (M. Borden ed. 1965) (emphasis added).
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"our Struggle for the natural Rights of Men. ... "256
E. Natural Law, the Bill of Rights, and the Ninth Amendment
The ultimate adoption of the Bill of Rights does not diminish the
validity of the claim that even without the Bill of Rights the Constitution
may limit the authority of the government to encroach upon individual
liberty.257 The American lawyers who contributed heavily to the revolu-
tionary and constitutional movements258 assumed the binding nature of
fundamental law bound all official and governmental action.2 9 Thus,
although James Madison stated that some rights asserted (not created) in
the proposed amendments were based on practice and on the nature of
the political compact, he also noted that others found their basis in the
laws of nature.26
256. 4 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 325 (H. Cushing ed. 1968) (Letter from Samuel
Adams to Richard Henry Lee, Dec. 3, 1787). Although the Anti-Federalists throughout the
country opposed the Constitution for different and often inconsistent reasons, they all agreed
that the Constitution should have provided for the protection of natural and other rights.
Kaminski, supra note 237, at 145. The Anti-Federalist argument was well summarized by
Thomas Wait, publisher of the Cumberland Gazette of Portland, Maine. He argued that "[n]o
people under Heaven are so well acquainted with the natural rights of mankind, with the rights
that ever ought to be reserved in all civil compacts, as are the people of America." Id. at 143-
44 (quoting Letter from Thomas Wait to George Thatcher, Portland, Me. (Aug. 15, 1788)
(letter available at Thatcher Papers, Chamberlain Collection, Boston Public Library)).
257. The claims of the Anti-Federalists during the ratification process were the origin of
the Bill of Rights. A substantial amount of the Anti-Federalist cry for a bill of rights, how-
ever, can be explained as an attempt to defeat the ratification rather than a true concern over
the effects of the omission. Edmund Randolph, a former Anti-Federalist, claimed that the
Anti-Federalist call for amendments was to disguise their true intent to defeat ratification of
the Constitution. R. RUTLAND, supra note 191, at 167. Anti-Federalists therefore were not
the driving force for a bill of rights because they considered the proposed bill of rights to be
"half-measures." Palmer, supra note 114 (citing L. LEVY, EMERGENCY OF A NEW PRESS 261-
62 (1985)). Once the fervor caught on and commitments were made at the ratifying conven-
tions, however, the Bill of Rights became inevitable.
258. Of the fifty-five men who attended the Constitutional Convention, thirty-three were
lawyers. H. LYON, THE CONSTrrUTION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT 185 (1936).
259. R. POUND, supra note 13, at 61.
260. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (J. Gales ed. 1789):
In some instances they assert those rights which are exercised by the people in
forming and establishing a plan of Government. In other instances, they specify
those rights which are retained when particular powers are given up to be exercised
by the Legislature. In other instances, they specify positive rights, which may seem
to result from the nature of the compact. Trial by jury cannot be considered as a
natural right, but a right resulting from a social compact, which regulates the action
of the community, but is as essential to secure the liberty of the people as any one of
the pre-existent rights of nature. In others instances, they lay down dogmatic max-
ims with respect to the construction of the Government; declaring that the Legisla-
tive, Executive, and Judicial branches, shall be kept separate and distinct. Perhaps
the best way of securing this in practice is, to provide such checks as will prevent the
encroachment of the one upon the other.
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Furthermore, the Bill of Rights was not considered an exhaustive
listing. The Ninth Amendment is a constant reminder of this fact.261
When James Madison introduced the proposed Ninth Amendment to
Congress he said it was designed to defeat the argument that "by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, [the Bill of
Rights] would disparage those rights... which were not singled out."
262
As originally submitted to Congress on June 8, 1789, the Ninth Amend-
ment read as follows:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in
favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish
the just importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to
enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution; but either as ac-
tual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater
caution.263
The failure to recognize the substantive significance of the Ninth
Amendment makes it a hollow form of words with no particular mean-
ing. However, "[n]othing in the Constitution should be taken to be idle
and of no moment. ' '2 64 The Ninth Amendment calls modem constitu-
tional scholars to the task of making "the natural law and natural rights
as believed in by the founders of our polity effective political and legal
instruments in the society of today.
265
Therefore, it is an error to think that the basis of our rights against
and the limitations of governmental power is found solely in the text of
the Constitution and Bill of Rights.266 The genesis of the Bill of Rights
was a desire to "remove the fears and quiet the apprehension of many of
the good people of the commonwealth, and more effectually guard
against an undue administration of the federal government, ' 267 but not
to create rights.
As noted earlier, much individual rights adjudication centers upon
some of the Constitution's open ended provisions. As a result, in order
to advance the underlying principles inherent in the rights guaranteed by
261. "The enumeration [not creation] in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX
(emphasis added).
262. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
263. Id. at 435.
264. Pound, Introduction to B. PATTERSON, supra note 57, at iii.
265. Id.
266. Storing, supra note 251, at 16.
267. 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION 177 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) (statements by John Hancock to the Massachu-
setts Ratification Convention). After the Massachusetts convention, similar calls for a bill of
rights were made in every ratifying convention except Maryland. Storing, supra note 251, at
17.
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the Constitution, these provisions must be read in light of the prevailing
legal philosophy in early American society. A significant component of
this philosophy was that popular government had to be reconciled with
"higher standards of political morality"=6 -with natural law theories.269
As part of an originalistic method of interpretation, it is not only proper
but necessary to resort to natural law theories in determining and apply-
ing the principles that underlay the Constitution.
This interpretive approach is consistent with moderate intentional-
ism. The colonists realized that they had not discovered all of the princi-
ples inherent in natural law. Nor had they determined how best to
advance those which had been discovered.270 The accepted inalienability
of some rights derived from natural law did not mean these rights re-
mained static. The prevalent view of natural law was that "when [God]
created man,... he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature
and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those
laws."271 The ascertainment of natural law and the rights it brings, how-
ever, is a process of discovery. As we acquire more knowledge about our
species and its nature and the nature of our world, the application of the
rights that are derived from these natural laws must evolve along with
our understanding. In early American thought, the laws were immuta-
ble, but as the operative factors change-due to a better understanding or
changes in circumstances-so must the specific application. It is only in
this way that we better achieve the principles that underlie the laws of
our nation.272
268. Barber, The Federalist and the Anomalies of New Right Constitutionalism, 15 N. KY.
L. REV. 437, 439 (1988).
269. "[The very persistence of such evocative, rather than sharply definitive, phrases at-
tests the strength of our natural law inheritance ...." A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 112 (1976). See also J. ELY, supra note 2, at 13 (the
open-ended provisions are an "invitation to look beyond their four comers").
270. Thomas Waite argued in favor of a bill of rights:
During the last fifteen or twenty years, it has been the business of the ablest politi-
cians (politicians too, who were contending for the liberties of the people) to dis-
cover, 'and draw a line between, those rights which must be surrendered, and those
which may be reserved'-If not the whole truth, yet, many great truths have been
discovered, are now fresh in our minds, and I think OUGHT TO BE RECORDED.
Letter from Thomas Wait to George Thatcher, Portland, Me. (Aug. 15, 1788) (quoted in Ka-
minski, supra note 237, at 143-44) (letter available at Thatcher Papers, Chamberlain Collec-
tion, Boston Public Library) (emphasis added).
271. 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 29 (Lewis ed. 1897).
272. See B. PATTERSON, supra note 57, at 54:
As we become more civilized, we learn more about the natural forces of the world,
such as the use and properties of our elementary minerals, steam, electricity, and
other natural forces. We also increase in spiritual and intellectual growth and are
capable of understanding natural rights and liberties that have always existed, but
which have been beyond our limited intellect to comprehend.
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1V. Conclusion
This Article presents and defends moderate intentionalism as a
method of constitutional interpretation. This method yields better and
more consistent results than other major methods that presently are be-
ing advocated. Moderate intentionalism provides guidelines absent in
nonoriginalistic methods of interpretation. Like strict originalism, mod-
erate intentionalism is bound by the original Constitution. Unlike strict
originalism, however, moderate intentionalism is flexible enough to allow
the Constitution to adapt in response to a changing society. This pro-
posed method is also superior to textualism because intentionalism not
only takes into account the plain meaning of the text, but also considers
the underlying principles of the Constitution and is more consistent with
original interpretive intent.
The suggestions made in this Article do not lead to easy answers in
constitutional adjudication. The brand of moderate intentionalism advo-
cated here requires interpreters of the Constitution to discover the nature
and content of the underlying principles that support the rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution. These same interpreters must also reconcile
conflicting interests protected by these various rights through applica-
tions of the Constitution that continue to serve its underlying principles.
None of the inquiries necessary to make these determinations will have
readily available answers or easy-to-follow directions. The proper resolu-
tion to these inquiries will be a difficult, and sometimes impossible, en-
deavor. If we are to strive for legitimate judicial enforcement of the
Constitution, however, we must be willing to try.

